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 Cybercrime is, undoubtedly, a growing problem. Scarcely a week goes by without 
reports of massive online misconduct. The primary federal legislative response so far 
has been to impose computer abuse liability on network attackers. Every state has 
enacted a similar statute. 
But do these cybercrime statutes actually punish and deter hackers? Members of 
Congress and Department of Justice prosecutors think so—and have repeatedly sought to 
expand the scope and consequences of liability. Meanwhile, scholars, advocates, and some 
judges have argued that computer abuse legislation is overbroad and ineffective. Law 
and policy debate has proceeded from these dueling narratives, not from data. 
This Article presents the first comprehensive empirical analysis of litigation under the 
federal cybercrime statute, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. Drawing on a new dataset 
compiled from hundreds of civil and criminal pleadings, the Article addresses fundamental 
and unanswered questions about the on-the-ground function of cybercrime law. 
The data reflect that there has been a nationwide cybercrime litigation explosion, 
and most cases look nothing like the hacker archetype. The overwhelming majority of 
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civil claims arise from mundane business and employment disputes, not sophisticated 
computer intrusions. And while federal prosecutors do sometimes charge serious offenders, 
the plurality fact pattern in criminal litigation involves a low-level government employee 
mishandling data. What’s more, cybercrime law appears to be redundant in civil cases, 
and there is little reason to believe that it deters the most concerning hackers. 
The Article closes with normative recommendations. In the near term, I suggest that 
(1) Congress and state legislatures should repeal civil cybercrime liability, (2) prosecutors 
should establish enforcement policies that prioritize significant misconduct, and (3) courts 
should narrowly construe cybercrime statutes to better effectuate legislative intent. As a 
structural matter, I challenge the net benefit of cybercrime law. An expansive computer 
abuse construct is a poor fit for modern technology, which is increasingly pervasive and 
increasingly shared. Policy should emphasize alternative means of protecting computer 
security and privacy. 
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“[T]he majority of [cybercrime] cases still involve                            
‘classic’ hacking activities.” 
—Pacific Aerospace & Electronics, Inc. v. Taylor1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Phillip Fadriquela was the archetypal hacker.2 By day, the twenty-six-year-
old labored as a data processing drone; by night, he broke into federal 
computer systems. “I was just playing,” he would later insist to the media.3 In 
1985, Fadriquela earned the first-ever criminal indictment under the primary 
federal cybercrime statute, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).4 
 
1 295 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1196 (E.D. Wash. 2003); see also P.C. Yonkers, Inc. v. Celebrations the 
Party and Seasonal Superstore, LLC, 428 F.3d 504, 510 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Pacific Aerospace for 
the proposition that most CFAA cases are about “classic” hacking); Dresser-Rand Co. v. Jones, 957 
F. Supp. 2d 610, 616 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (citing P.C. Yonkers for the same underlying claim); 1st Rate 
Mortg. Corp. v. Vision Mortgage Servs. Corp., No. 09-C-471, 2011 WL 666088, at *3 (E.D. Wis. 
Feb. 15, 2011) (same); Guest-Tek Interactive Entm’t, Inc. v. Pullen, 665 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D. Mass. 
2009) (same); Dudick ex rel. Susquehanna Precision, Inc. v. Vaccarro, No. 3:06-CV-2175, 2007 WL 
1847435, at *5 (M.D. Pa. June 25, 2007) (same). 
2 See Joseph B. Tompkins, Jr. & Frederick S. Ansell, Computer Crime: Keeping Up with High Tech 
Criminals, CRIM. JUST., Winter 1987, at 31, 32 (noting that Fadriquela was the only person who had 
ever been indicted under the 1984 law that CFAA then amended in 1986); Glenn D. Baker, Note, 
Trespassers Will Be Prosecuted: Computer Crime in the 1990s, 12 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. 
L. 61, 65-66 (1993) (describing Fadriquela as “a Los Angeles computer hacker”); Mitch Betts, DP 
Worker Charged with Hacking, COMPUTERWORLD, Feb. 11, 1985, at 2 (highlighting the indictment); 
Paul Korzeniowski, Agencies’ Hacker Troubles Blamed on Bulletin Board, COMPUTERWORLD, July 8, 
1985, at 15 (outlining Fadriquela’s actions in further detail).  
3 The Region: Gang Members Aid Landmark Cleanup, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1985, at OC2. 
4 Tompkins & Ansell, supra note 2, at 31-32. Although at the time of Fadriquela’s indictment 
the statute was called “The Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,” his 
conviction is properly understood as the first CFAA conviction because Congress renamed the 
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 Dyanne Deuel managed medical technicians for a chintzy chain of surgical 
clinics.5 Her “1-800-GET-THIN” employer had already aroused suspicion 
for unusually frequent complications and misleading advertisements.6 In 
2012, Deuel dropped a bombshell whistleblower lawsuit, alleging that 
physicians had covered up flagrant malpractice that contributed to a patient’s 
death.7 In response, Deuel’s employers filed their own suit alleging a civil 
CFAA violation.8 To blow the whistle, they argued, Deuel had checked the 
patient’s electronic chart.9 She shouldn’t have. 
Fadriquela and Deuel bookend a radical transformation in cybercrime law. 
What began as a tentative legislative response to the archetypal young, rogue 
hacker has evolved into sweeping doctrine with severe remedies. Read broadly, 
contemporary cybercrime law does not just address sophisticated hacking. It 
also imposes worldwide civil and criminal liability that displaces trade secret, 
property, contract, fraud, and copyright law in the information economy.10 
 
statute “The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act” as part of the 1986 Amendments. See generally Pub. 
L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012)). 
5 Complaint at 3, Deuel v. 1 800 GET THIN, LLC, No. BC477064 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 17, 2012). 
6 See Stuart Pfeifer, Another Patient Dies After Lap-Band Surgery, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2011), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/23/business/la-fi-lap-band-death-20110924 [https://perma.cc/7WD4-
XJWK] (“[P]atients’ deaths and injuries have led to a series of wrongful-death and personal injury lawsuits 
against 1-800-GET-THIN, its affiliated surgery centers and doctors who performed the procedures.”); 
Press Release, Food & Drug Admin., FDA Issues Warning Letters for Misleading Advertising of             
Lap-Band (Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm28
3455.htm [https://perma.cc/7SJK-TZQT] (warning consumers that advertisements for 1-800-GET-THIN 
“fail to provide required risk information, including warnings, precautions, possible side effects and 
contraindications”). 
7 Complaint at 14-16, Deuel, No. BC477064 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 17, 2012); Stuart Pfeifer, Patients 
Allege ‘Gruesome Conditions’ at Lap-Band Clinics, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/
2012/jan/17/business/la-fi-get-thin-whistleblower-20120118 [https://perma.cc/445R-GUP7]. The local 
coroner’s expert subsequently described the medical practice as “gross negligence with 
incompetence.” Stuart Pfeifer, Errors Cited in Lap-Band Operation, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2013), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/apr/19/business/la-fi-get-thin-rojeski-20130420 [https://perma.cc/
B3DV-BTM7]. 
8 Complaint at 8-11, Beverly Hills Surgery Ctr., LLC v. Deuel, No. 12-CV-1789 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2012). 
9 Id. at 8. 
10 See Kyle W. Brenton, Trade Secret Law and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Two Problems 
and Two Solutions, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 429, 441-51 (explaining how a CFAA claim is 
both easier to prove than a trade secret claim and less limited by concessions to employee mobility 
and morality); Christine D. Galbraith, Access Denied: Improper Use of the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act to Control Information on Publicly Accessible Internet Websites, 63 MD. L. REV. 320, 340-41 (2004) 
(noting how CFAA can protect uncopyrightable information without the limitations of contract 
law); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Common Law and Statutory Restrictions on Access: Contract, Trespass, and 
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 295, 297-310 (comparing 
contract, copyright, and trespass to chattels protections against CFAA); Thomas E. Booms, Note, 
Hacking into Federal Court: Employee “Authorization” Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 13 VAND. 
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 543, 550-51 (2011) (noting that a CFAA claim is easier to prove than a trade 
secret claim); Katherine Mesenbring Field, Note, Agency, Code, or Contract: Determining Employees’ 
Authorization Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 107 MICH. L. REV. 819, 845-46 (2009) (same); 
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Proponents of expansive cybercrime law in both the legislative and 
executive branches have emphasized the government’s need to combat online 
threats that are growing in frequency, impact, and sophistication.11 Scholars, 
advocates, and some judges, meanwhile, have argued that computer abuse 
legislation is overbroad and ineffective.12 The debate over the appropriate scope 
and sanctions for cybercrime law has played out for years, based almost 
exclusively on these dueling narratives and their accompanying anecdotes. 
Hard data are long overdue. 
This Article presents the first comprehensive empirical analysis of 
cybercrime litigation in the federal courts. Drawing on a new dataset compiled 
from hundreds of civil and criminal CFAA pleadings, the Article answers 
foundational questions about the practical function of cybercrime law. 
Part I sets the stage, attempting to articulate the two competing 
viewpoints on cybercrime liability. It also highlights untested factual 
assumptions that underpin both perspectives. Part II dives into data. It begins 
by explaining the sources and methodology for this study, then provides 
quantitative responses to specific unanswered questions at the heart of the 
cybercrime debate. The data reflect that, in recent years, there has been a 
nationwide cybercrime litigation explosion—and most of these cases look 
nothing like hacking. The overwhelming majority of civil claims arise from 
mundane employment and commercial disputes, not sophisticated computer 
intrusions. And the most common fact pattern in criminal prosecutions arises 
from low-level government employees merely misappropriating data. 
Moreover, cybercrime law appears to be both internally and externally 
redundant in civil cases, and there is little reason to believe that the law 
meaningfully deters sophisticated hackers. 
Part III offers three workable recommendations for correcting cybercrime 
law. Congress should repeal civil liability because it is misdirected, 
unnecessary, and introduces expansionist pressures. The Department of 
Justice should articulate a cybercrime enforcement policy that focuses 
resources on serious offenders and differentiates among distinct cybercrime 
offenses. And, to better fulfill Congressional intent, the courts should 
narrowly construe cybercrime statutes. 
To conclude, I challenge the net benefit of cybercrime liability. I argue that 
dedicated cybercrime statutes have a sharply limited upside. Information 
technology has become too pervasive and too shared for computer abuse to 
 
Garrett D. Urban, Note, Causing Damage Without Authorization: The Limitations of Current Judicial 
Interpretations of Employee Authorization Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 52 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1369, 1390-91 (2011) (arguing that CFAA threatens to displace state contract and trade secret law). 
11 See infra Section I.A. 
12 See infra Section I.B. 
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remain an expansive legal construct. Congress should focus on alternative 
mechanisms for promoting cybersecurity. 
I. COMPETING PERSPECTIVES ON CYBERCRIME LAW 
Initially, cybercrime law was not very controversial.13 When the state and 
federal legislatures began dabbling in the area in the 1970s and 1980s, they 
were bolstered by contemporaneous, sensationalized media reports of 
youthful hacking escapades.14 Prosecutors requested new tools for 
investigating and combating electronic misconduct, and lawmakers were quick 
to equip them.15 While a handful of commenters questioned the need for 
dedicated computer abuse statutes and expressed hypothetical concerns about 
overbreadth, they posed scant political opposition. Congress enacted CFAA in 
1984, and by 2000, every state had a cybercrime law on the books.16 
 
13 See Richard C. Hollinger & Lonn Lanza-Kaduce, The Process of Criminalization: The Case of 
Computer Crime Laws, 26 CRIMINOLOGY 101, 106-07 (1988) (recounting that media attention in the 
early 1980s “ensured that both the public and its elected representatives ‘knew’ that computer crime 
was a major problem and that something had to be done quickly”). 
14 See id. (describing media fixation on “juvenile hackers and the perceived threat of computer 
crime” in the early 1980s); Reid Skibell, Cybercrimes & Misdemeanors: A Reevaluation of the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 909, 910, 917-18 (2003) (noting that CFAA was passed 
in part due to the movie WarGames, which reinforced a public fear of computer crime); Mary M. 
Calkins, Note, They Shoot Trojan Horses, Don’t They? An Economic Analysis of Anti-Hacking Regulatory 
Models, 89 GEO. L.J. 171, 175-77 (2000) (emphasizing that WarGames strongly influenced the public’s 
stereotype of what a hacker looks like); Declan McCullagh, From ‘WarGames’ to Aaron Swartz: How U.S. 
Anti-Hacking Law Went Astray, CNET (Mar. 13, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-
57573985-38/from-wargames-to-aaron-swartz-how-u.s-anti-hacking-law-went-astray/ [https://perma.cc/U
C55-DL2L] (describing political and media focus on The 414s, a group of young hackers that accessed 
sensitive government and private computer systems around the time that WarGames was released); see also 
Greg Pollaro, Note, Disloyal Computer Use and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Narrowing the Scope, 2010 
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 12, ¶ 4 (“War Games introduced much of the country to the ‘hacker,’ and its 
influence was not lost on members of Congress, who already were trying to decide what to do about . . . 
network trespassers . . . .”); Tompkins & Ansell, supra note 2, at 31 (“[M]any [legal] practitioners probably 
consider computer crime to be the light-hearted, glamorous avocation of whiz kids.”).  
15 See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-CIT-297, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY: MANAGEMENT, SECURITY, AND CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 89-91 (Feb. 1986) 
(providing an overview of computer crime legislative proposals in the 98th and 99th Congresses); Robin K. 
Kutz, Note, Computer Crime in Virginia: A Critical Examination of the Criminal Offenses in the Virginia Computer 
Crimes Act, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 783, 785-88 (1986) (observing that law enforcement in the 1970s realized 
that federal criminal law did not easily cover computer crime, so Congress intervened to pass new legislation). 
16 See Computer Crime Statutes, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (June 12, 2015), http://
www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/computer-hacking-and-
unauthorized-access-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/96WE-3P88] (collecting state computer abuse 
statutes); see also Hollinger & Lanza-Kaduce, supra note 13, at 101-04 (reviewing how state law 
evolved to address computer crime); Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1003, 1017 (2001) (“[W]hen Vermont enacted a statute proscribing computer crime in 1999, it 
became the fiftieth state to devote specific legislation to computer crimes.”); John Montgomery, 
Computer Crime, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 429, 430 (1987) (noting the proliferation of state computer 
crime statutes by 1987); Douglas M. Reimer, Judicial and Legislative Responses to Computer Crimes, 53 
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Beginning in the mid-2000s, the cybercrime law debate took on new 
vitality—and became more heated. Prosecutors and their allies in Congress 
continued to request expanded authority, emphasizing the increasing 
frequency, magnitude, and sophistication of online attacks.17 Section A 
attempts to articulate the best arguments in favor of this expansionist 
perspective on cybercrime law. 
Scholars and advocacy organizations, meanwhile, began to press for a 
rollback.18 The law had become too broad and too ambiguous, they argued. 
Courts started to agree, adopting narrower interpretations of statutory scope 
and, in one high-profile case, concluding that a criminal offense was 
unconstitutionally vague.19 Section B explains this critical perspective on 
cybercrime, drawing on policy arguments and anecdotes of litigation abuse. 
Section C closes with an explanation of why empirical analyses are 
overdue. Evaluating these two perspectives is impossible in the abstract, 
because they depend upon particular factual assumptions about the function 
of cybercrime law. Policymakers and the judiciary require an understanding 
of the law on the ground. 
A. The Expansionist Perspective 
At one pole of the cybercrime litigation debate, proponents argue in favor 
of sweeping liability and stringent remedies.20 Online malfeasance is 
spiraling out of control, the reasoning goes. Consumers are increasingly at 
risk for online fraud, identity theft, harassment, and worse. Sophisticated 
 
INS. COUNS. J. 406, 419-30 (1986) (surveying computer crime statutes in twenty-three states); 
Michael P. Dierks, Note, Computer Network Abuse, 6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307, 322-25 (1993) 
(reviewing the evolution of state computer crime law); Kutz, supra note 15, at 789-90 (describing the 
varying computer crime statutes in fourty-five states by 1986). 
17 ERIC A. FISCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42114, FEDERAL LAWS RELATING TO 
CYBERSECURITY: OVERVIEW AND DISCUSSION OF PROPOSED REVISIONS 1 (2013). 
18 See infra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. 
20 The perspective in this Section is, necessarily, a synthesis of myriad viewpoints. For detailed 
arguments in favor of expanding cybercrime law, see generally Frank P. Andreano, The Evolution of 
Federal Computer Crime Policy: The Ad Hoc Approach to an Ever-Changing Problem, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 
81 (1999); Richard Warner, The Employer’s New Weapon: Employee Liability Under the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act, 12 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 11 (2008); Peter A. Winn, The Guilty Eye: Unauthorized 
Access, Trespass and Privacy, 62 BUS. LAW. 1395 (2007); Sarah Castle, Note, Cyberbullying on Trial: 
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and United States v. Drew, 17 J.L. & POL’Y 579 (2009); Joseph P. 
Daly, Note, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act—A New Perspective: Let the Punishment Fit the Damage, 
12 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 445 (1993); Graham M. Liccardi, Note, The Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act: A Vehicle for Litigating Trade Secrets in Federal Court, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 155 (2008); Matthew Aaron Viana, Note, Aaron’s Law: Reactionary Legislation in 
the Guise of Justice, 10 U. MASS. L. REV. 214 (2015); Scott Zambo, Note, Digital La Cosa Nostra: The 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act’s Failure to Punish and Deter Organized Crime, 33 NEW ENG. J. ON 
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 551 (2007). 
1460 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 164: 1452 
intruders are ransacking businesses and universities for their intellectual 
property. Foreign powers are pilfering government secrets. 
The usual legal mechanism for addressing misconduct is, of course, imposing 
liability. Businesses should have legal recourse to protect their property-like 
rights in information technology and intellectual assets.21 And prosecutors should 
have effective legal tools for investigating and addressing online misconduct. 
 There are some high-profile criminal litigation successes to report. The 
Department of Justice effectively dismantled LulzSec, a hacker collective that 
breached or disabled over a dozen online services.22 Federal prosecutors have 
also knocked major botnets and malware vendors offline.23 
But because the status quo still involves an unacceptable level of 
cybercrime, the thinking goes, broader authorities and tougher sanctions are 
needed.24 Otherwise, would-be hackers will remain insufficiently deterred (ex 
ante) or punished (ex post). 
 
21 See O’Rourke, supra note 10, at 308 (“The CFAA essentially functions like a federal claim for 
trespass.”); Winn, supra note 20, at 1397-1403 (viewing CFAA as a property right in information technology). 
22 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, S. Dist. of N.Y., Leading Member of the International 
Cybercriminal Group “Lulzsec” Sentenced in Manhattan Federal Court (May 27, 2014), 
http://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/leading-member-international-cybercriminal-group-lulzsec-
sentenced-manhattan-federal [https://perma.cc/DV5P-4B6P]; Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, 
Cent. Dist. of Cal., Second Member of Hacking Group Sentenced to Over Year in Prison for Stealing 
Customer Information from Sony Pictures Computers (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/usao-
cdca/pr/second-member-hacking-group-sentenced-over-year-prison-stealing-customer-information [https://
perma.cc/7EFZ-N6YZ]; Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, S. Dist. of N.Y., Manhattan U.S. Attorney 
Announces Guilty Plea of Jeremy Hammond for Hacking into the Stratfor Website (May 28, 2013), 
http://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-announces-guilty-plea-jeremy-hammond-
hacking-stratfor-website [https://perma.cc/F8N3-5PYJ]; Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Cent. Dist. of 
Cal., Member of LulzSec Hacking Group Sentenced to Over Year in Federal Prison for 2011 Intrusion into 
Sony Pictures Computer Systems (Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/member-lulzsec-
hacking-group-sentenced-over-year-federal-prison-2011-intrusion-sony [https://perma.cc/YAS7-3X9R]; see 
also GABRIELLA COLEMAN, HACKER, HOAXER, WHISTLEBLOWER, SPY: THE MANY FACES OF 
ANONYMOUS 237-75 (2014) (describing the LulzSec group). 
23 E.g., David B. Fein, Major Achievements in the Courtroom: Coreflood Botnet Takedown & Civil Action, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (July 9, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/usao/priority-areas/cyber-crime/major-
achievements-courtroom-coreflood-botnet-takedown-civil-action [https://perma.cc/ZY9B-KZ73]; Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Major Computer Hacking Forum Dismantled (July 15, 2015), http://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/major-computer-hacking-forum-dismantled [https://perma.cc/5TVH-F6UF]; 
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Pakistani Man Indicted for Selling ‘StealthGenie’ Spyware App (Sept. 
29, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/pakistani-man-indicted-selling-stealthgenie-spyware-app 
[https://perma.cc/5SDQ-9ZEE]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Leads Multi-National 
Action Against “Gameover Zeus” Botnet and “Cryptolocker” Ransomware, Charges Botnet 
Administrator (June 2, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-leads-multi-national-action-against-
gameover-zeus-botnet-and-cryptolocker-ransomware [https://perma.cc/9632-DD55]; Press Release, 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Cyber Criminal Pleads Guilty to Developing and Distributing Notorious 
SpyEye Malware (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/cyber-criminal-pleads-guilty-
developing-and-distributing-notorious-spyeye-malware [https://perma.cc/YD66-5DCZ]. 
24 See, e.g., Cyber Crime: Modernizing Our Legal Framework for the Information Age: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Crime & Terrorism of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 5 (2015) (statement 
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The expansionist perspective has manifested itself in several federal 
legislative proposals. In 2011, the White House and the Department of Justice 
drafted a high-profile CFAA reform package that would have expanded the scope 
of liability, increased prison sentences, provided civil forfeiture authority, and 
added a RICO predicate offense.25 The 2011 package has been the basis for more 
recent proposals, including a 2013 discussion draft that was circulated by the 
House Judiciary Committee staff,26 an early 2015 White House pitch in 
conjunction with the State of the Union,27 and a mid-2015 draft Senate bill.28 
The expansionist perspective on cybercrime law is, to be sure, not an 
absolutist perspective. Department of Justice officials have acknowledged 
concerns about statutory overbreadth and have emphasized the limiting role 
of prosecutorial discretion.29 More recent legislative proposals have also 
 
of David M. Bitkower, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Department of Justice) (describing court 
decisions that narrowly construe  CFAA as “unfortunate”) [hereinafter Bitkower statement]; Taking 
Down Botnets: Public and Private Efforts to Disrupt and Dismantle Cybercriminal Networks: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Crime & Terrorism of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 9 (2014) 
(statement of Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Department of Justice) (arguing that 
CFAA is not “up to date” and must “keep up with rapidly evolving technologies and uses”); 
Cybercrime: Updating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to Protect Cyberspace and Combat Emerging 
Threats: Testimony Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 3-4 (2011) (statement of James A. 
Baker, Associate Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Department of Justice) (arguing that federal law must 
“more effectively deter” computer crime and setting forth a proposal to amend the law to “increase 
the maximum penalties”). 
25 See GINA STEVENS & JONATHAN MILLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41941, THE 
OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S CYBERSECURITY PROPOSAL: CRIMINAL PROVISIONS 3-6 (2011) 
(describing the provisions of the reform package). 
26 See Mike Masnick, Rather Than Fix the CFAA, House Judiciary Planning to Make It Worse . . . Way 
Worse, TECHDIRT (Mar. 25, 2013, 5:43 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130324/14342822435/
rather-than-fix-cfaa-house-judiciary-committee-planning-to-make-it-worse-way-worse.shtml [https://
perma.cc/LS2E-25HM] (describing the unattributed discussion draft and providing a copy). 
27 THE WHITE HOUSE, UPDATED ADMINISTRATION PROPOSAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT 
PROVISIONS (2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/updated-
law-enforcement-tools.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Z7Y-AT96]; see also Letter from Shaun Donovan, Dir., 
Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to John A. Boehner, Speaker of the House of Representatives (Jan. 13, 
2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/cybersecurity-letters-to-
congress-house-signed.pdf [https://perma.cc/YP7U-6U36] (presenting and summarizing the Obama 
Administration’s proposed substantive changes to the existing statutory regime); Barack H. Obama, 
2015 State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
2015/01/20/remarks-president-state-union-address-january-20-2015 [https://perma.cc/CX9A-7WRH] 
(“I [President Obama] urge this Congress to finally pass the legislation we need to better meet the 
evolving threat of cyberattacks . . . .”). 
28 See Harley Geiger, Graham/Whitehouse Draft Bill Would Make CFAA Worse, CDT BLOG (July 
17, 2015), https://cdt.org/blog/grahamwhitehouse-draft-bill-would-make-cfaa-worse/ [https://perma.
cc/F5ND-68JC] (explaining the proposed legislation and providing a copy). 
29 See Bitkower statement, supra note 24, at 6 (“These [limiting] judicial decisions stemmed 
from the concern that the relevant provision of the CFAA could potentially make relatively trivial 
conduct a federal crime—such as checking the baseball scores  . . . in violation of an employer’s strict 
Internet use policy. The department has no interest in prosecuting such harmless acts.”); Leslie R. 
Caldwell, Prosecuting Privacy Abuses by Corporate and Government Insiders, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.: 
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included (very modest) protections for ordinary Internet users.30 But the core 
of the viewpoint remains that cybercrime law is a valuable and effective tool, 
and litigation abuses are and will be rare and manageable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JUST. BLOGS (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/blog/prosecuting-privacy-abuses-corporate-
and-government-insiders [https://perma.cc/4LNL-PXN2] (“We understand these [overbreadth] 
concerns. The Department of Justice has no interest in prosecuting harmless violations of use 
restrictions like these.”). 
30 The 2015 Obama administration proposal would introduce a new monetary threshold for 
CFAA liability. See THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 27 (triggering liability under CFAA only if the 
value of the illegally-acquired information exceeds $5000). Given how easily litigants have pled 
around CFAA’s existing monetary threshold, it is not apparent that this provision would 
meaningfully constrain liability. 
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B. The Critical Perspective 
A competing view of cybercrime liability has gained traction,31 
particularly among scholars,32 policy advocates,33 and members of the 
 
31 While this Article endeavors to objectively assess cybercrime litigation in the federal courts, 
in the interest of complete transparency, I fall firmly within the school of thought that criticizes 
cybercrime law. That view is informed as much by policy and legal considerations as it is by the 
empirical assessment presented here. 
32 A voluminous academic literature has criticized cybercrime law, and especially CFAA, as 
overbroad or overly punitive. See, e.g., Brenton, supra note 10, at 440-56 (explaining that CFAA 
presents inconsistencies with trade secret law); Galbraith, supra note 10, at 361-66 (arguing that 
courts have improperly construed CFAA to permit website owners to enforce restrictions on access 
to and use of copyrightable information); Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and 
“Authorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1617-32 (2003) (explaining how 
courts have expansively interpreted the concepts of “access” and “authorization” under CFAA to 
capture undesirable behavior, and arguing that such a broad sweep is normatively undesirable); Orin 
S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1575-78 
(2010) (arguing that a broad construction of “authorization” under CFAA may amount to 
unconstitutional vagueness); Andrea M. Matwyshyn, The Law of the Zebra, 28 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 155, 182-208 (2013) (criticizing CFAA for permitting both criminal and civil liability for 
contractual breaches); O’Rourke, supra note 10, at 308 (“Congress likely did not intend the [CFAA] 
statute to become the potent weapon that it now is ‘against employees, former employees, 
competitors and others.’ Unanticipated uses of the Act have arisen because its language is not limited 
to cases of hacking but instead is broad enough to encompass a wide range of conduct.” (footnote 
omitted)); Skibell, supra note 14, at 922-43 (arguing that CFAA mistakenly treats the crime of 
trespass and the crime of fraud or theft identically, imposes unfair punishments on some individuals, 
has done little to slow the growth of computer crime, and imposes unnecessarily high penalties that 
do not serve proper deterrent or retribution purposes). See generally Booms, supra note 10; Sarah 
Boyer, Note, Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Abusing Federal Jurisdiction?, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 661 (2009); Cyrus Y. Chung, Note, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: How Computer Science 
Can Help with the Problem of Overbreadth, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 233 (2010); Dierks, supra note 16; 
Katherine Mesenbring Field, Note, Agency, Code, or Contract: Determining Employees’ Authorization 
Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 107 MICH. L. REV. 819 (2009); Andrew T. Hernacki, Note, 
A Vague Law in a Smartphone World: Limiting the Scope of Unauthorized Access Under the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1543 (2012); Haeji Hong, Note, Hacking Through the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283 (1997); Nicholas R. Johnson, Recent Developments, 
“I Agree” to Criminal Liability: Lori Drew’s Prosecution Under § 1030(a)(2)(C) of the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act, and Why Every Internet User Should Care, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 561; 
Caroline G. Jones, Note, Computer Hackers on the Cul-de-Sac: MySpace Suicide Indictment Under the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Sets Dangerous Precedent, 17 WIDENER L. REV. 261 (2011); Ryan Patrick 
Murray, Note, MySpace-ing Is Not a Crime: Why Breaching Terms of Service Agreements Should Not 
Implicate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 29 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 475 (2009); Warren Thomas, 
Note, Lenity on Me: LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka Points the Way Toward Defining Authorization and 
Solving the Split over the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 379 (2011); Garrett D. 
Urban, Note, Causing Damage Without Authorization: The Limitations of Current Judicial Interpretations 
of Employee Authorization Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1369 
(2011); Note, The Vagaries of Vagueness: Rethinking the CFAA as a Problem of Private Nondelegation, 127 
HARV. L. REV. 751 (2013). 
33 See, e.g., Letter from Internet Infrastructure Coalition (i2Coalition) et al., to Rep. Jim 
Sensenbrenner et al. (Mar. 12, 2013), https://www.eff.org/files/cfaa_innovators_letter_3-12-13_final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4QQR-YFW8] (urging Congress to reform CFAA due to its chilling effects on 
innovation and economic growth in the technology field). 
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judiciary.34 This perspective emphasizes how broad, vague cybercrime law poses 
grave legal peril for innocuous—and often desirable—computer-related conduct.35 
Articulations of this critical viewpoint tend to invoke the following at-risk 
categories of computer users. 
1. Consumers 
Under expansive cybercrime liability, run-of-the-mill online conduct 
could become a criminal offense. In Judge Kozinski’s memorable phrasing, 
ordinary consumers would “have to live at the mercy of [their] local 
prosecutor.”36 He added, “[P]osting for sale an item prohibited by Craigslist’s 
policy, or describing yourself as ‘tall, dark and handsome,’ when you’re 
actually short and homely, will earn you a handsome orange jumpsuit.”37 
The prosecution of Lori Drew is an oft-invoked anecdote in support of 
this critical perspective. Drew’s cybercrime liability rested on breaching the 
social network MySpace’s terms of use.38 The district court concluded that 
Drew had committed a statutory offense, but set aside the jury conviction as 
unconstitutionally void for vagueness.39 
More recently, federal prosecutors brought cybercrime charges against 
gamblers who discovered a glitch in slot machine payouts.40 The case was dropped 
only after a magistrate judge recommended dismissal on statutory grounds.41 
2. Employees 
Surveys have consistently found that many, if not most, employees breach 
corporate information technology policies.42 They shirk at work, swap 
 
34 For a particularly sharp critique offered by then–Chief Judge Alex Kozinski, see United 
States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 862-63 (9th Cir. 2012) (rejecting an expansive interpretation of CFAA 
on statutory, constitutional, and policy grounds). See also United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508,            
523-28 (2d Cir. 2015) (following Nosal); WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 
203-07 (4th Cir. 2012) (same). 
35 In the interest of brevity, this Article focuses on policy perspectives and empirical analysis 
rather than legal synthesis. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that nearly all online conduct 
that is conceivably objectionable could plausibly fall within the scope of civil and criminal sanctions. 
See supra note 32. 
36 Nosal, 676 F.3d at 862. 
37 Id. 
38 United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 452 (C.D. Cal. 2009); see also Nosal, 676 F.3d at 862 
(discussing Drew as a poor exercise of prosecutorial discretion). 
39 Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 464. 
40 Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge at 1-2, United States v. 
Kane, No. 2:11-cr-00022 (D. Nev. Oct. 15, 2012), ECF No. 86. 
41 Id. at 9. 
42 See, e.g., CISCO SYS. INC., DATA LEAKAGE WORLDWIDE: COMMON RISKS AND MISTAKES 
EMPLOYEES MAKE 1-7 (2008), http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/enterprise-networks/
data-loss-prevention/white_paper_c11-499060.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XXG-EW2Y] (giving numerous 
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passwords, take files home, and keep data when they exit the firm. All of these 
routine indiscretions could be criminal under a broad interpretation of 
cybercrime law: federal appellate courts have sustained liability merely for 
browsing a work database (in violation of employer policy)43 and taking files to a 
competitor (in violation of fiduciary responsibilities).44 Employers also would be 
equipped with a powerful civil cudgel against their former employees, enabling 
retaliation for exercising legal rights or whistleblowing.45 
3. Entrepreneurs 
Many online startups are iterative, built atop another business’s 
technology and data.46 A broad cybercrime law would encompass these 
innovation models such that failure to obtain a “platform” business’s 
permission would result in civil and criminal liability.47 This concern is no 
hypothetical—Craigslist,48 Facebook,49 and Oracle50 have all used CFAA to 
 
examples of employee misuse of information technology); PONEMON INST., DATA LOSS RISKS 
DURING DOWNSIZING: AS EMPLOYEES EXIT, SO DOES CORPORATE DATA 3-24 (2009), http://
eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-data_loss_risks_during_downsizing_study_
WP.en-us.pdf [http://perma.cc/47F4-FEU8] (providing in-depth data on misuse of confidential 
information); SYMANTEC CORP., WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE: HOW EMPLOYEES ARE PUTTING 
YOUR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT RISK 2 (2013) https://www4.symantec.com/mktginfo/white
paper/WP_WhatsYoursIsMine-HowEmployeesarePuttingYourIntellectualPropertyatRisk_dai211501_
cta69167.pdf [https://perma.cc/43KA-NQHN] (showing the “top reasons” why employees take 
corporate data). 
43 United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010). 
44 Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420-21 (7th Cir. 2006). 
45 See, e.g., Lee v. PMSI, Inc., No. 8:10-cv-2904, 2011 WL 1742028, at *2-3 (M.D. Fla. May 6, 2011) 
(dismissing a cybercrime counterclaim by a former employer in a wrongful termination suit, which 
alleged that the former employee was liable for merely checking personal email and social network 
accounts); see also United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 860 n.6 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Lee as an example 
of cybercrime overbreadth risks). 
46 The in-vogue term for this phenomenon is “platform.” See Benjamin Edelman, How to 
Launch Your Digital Platform, HARV. BUS. REV., Apr. 2015, at 92 (using the term “platform” to refer 
to shared technology foundations for new small businesses). 
47 See ALEXIS OHANIAN, WITHOUT THEIR PERMISSION 199-231 (2013) (arguing that 
information technology innovation occurs without seeking permission in advance, and laws that 
require permission necessarily impede innovation). 
48 See, e.g., Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1180 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (using 
CFAA against a business that republished classified advertisements); Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 
942 F. Supp. 2d 962, 969 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (same); Craigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc., 694 F. 
Supp. 2d 1039, 1049 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (using CFAA against a business that enabled automatic posting 
of classified advertisements). 
49 See, e.g., Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1027-28 (N.D. Cal. 
2012) (using CFAA against a website that aggregated information from multiple social network 
feeds); Facebook, Inc. v. MaxBounty, Inc., 274 F.R.D. 279, 281 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (using  CFAA against 
a marketing company that created misleading social network pages). 
50 See, e.g., Oracle Am., Inc. v. TERiX Comput. Co., No. 13-cv-03385, 2014 WL 31344, at *2 (N.D. 
Cal. Jan. 3, 2014) (using CFAA against an aftermarket service provider for database software); Oracle Am., 
Inc. v. Serv. Key, LLC, No. 12-cv-00790, 2012 WL 6019580, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2012) (same). 
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shut down derivative ventures. Even the Internet Archive, a nonprofit online 
library, was targeted with cybercrime litigation on the theory that it 
impermissibly browsed a public website with an automated crawler.51 
4. Journalists 
Investigative reporting often involves assessing obscure and unintended 
online sources. For instance, in a recent high-profile dispute, journalists at 
Scripps Howard discovered that FCC-subsidized telecommunications 
providers had leaked sensitive subscriber information onto the public 
Internet.52 One of the telecom firms responded by threatening cybercrime 
litigation against Scripps on the theory that the reporters lacked authorized 
access to the subscriber data.53 The FCC subsequently fined the firms for 
their deficient security practices.54 
In another episode, reporters from Vanity Fair and a local newspaper used 
online resources to investigate a “cult-like” executive training firm.55 The 
training firm sued, alleging that Vanity Fair’s research constituted an actionable 
violation of cybercrime law.56 After nearly two years of litigation, its claims 
were dismissed as untimely.57 
5. Security Researchers 
Outside experts routinely evaluate information technology systems for 
security shortcomings. But the purveyors of those systems tend to get testy 
when deficiencies in their products and services are unceremoniously 
exposed.58 For instance, Sony used cybercrime law to prevent a young 
 
51 See Healthcare Advocates v. Harding, Earley, Follmer & Frailey, 497 F. Supp. 2d 627,         
630-33 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (describing the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine crawler and its alleged 
cybercrime infraction). 
52 Sarah Laskow, Reporting, or Illegal Hacking: Scripps Reporters Are Accused of Violating the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (June 13, 2013), http://www.cjr.org/
cloud_control/scripps_hackers.php [https://perma.cc/RS3W-8S66]. 
53 Id. 
54 Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, TerraCom, Inc. and YourTel America, Inc., No. 
EB-TCD-13-00009175, at 1 (FCC Oct. 24, 2014), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/ 
FCC-14-173A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/BTE7-NDWA]. 
55 See William D. Cohan, How a Strange, Secretive, Cult-Like Company Is Waging Legal War Against 
Journalists, NATION (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/how-strange-secretive-cult-
company-waging-legal-war-against-journalists/ [https://perma.cc/AQ2L-R6W6]. 
56 Id. 
57 NXIVM Corp. v. Foley, No. 14-cv-01375, slip op. at 13 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2015) 
58 See, e.g., Letter from Alex Stamos et al. to the House and Senate Judiciary Comms. (Aug. 1, 2013), 
https://www.eff.org/files/dc_bh_letter_f4.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZP38-BDMQ] (“[P]aradoxically, the 
CFAA currently threatens and chills valuable research in the field by reaching mere violations of terms of 
use and other acts, such as security research, which cause no real harm and indeed make the public safer.”). 
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researcher from examining its PlayStation 3 video game system;59 the 
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority prevented MIT students from 
presenting flaws in its fare payment system;60 and federal prosecutors won a 
conviction against a researcher who exposed a vulnerability in AT&T’s iPad 
registration system.61 Criticism along this line has emphasized that 
cybercrime liability is, in fact, backfiring: by chilling vital research, 
cybercrime law actually reduces computer security.62 
 
Legal scholars have noted how conventional doctrines of trespass, labor 
law, trade secret, copyright, and contract make concessions to these sorts of 
public interests.63 Cybercrime law, however, offers no such limiting 
principles. There are no implied easements. No employee rights. No secrecy 
and independent wrongdoing elements. No fair use defense. No limits on 
contract formation and interpretation. Absence of permission is too often the 
beginning and the end of a cybercrime liability inquiry. 
These are far from the only lines of attack. Critics question the very 
notion of using criminal law to deter computer intrusions when perpetrators 
are often difficult to identify or outside the reach of United States law.64 Some 
of the worst offenders are sponsored by foreign governments: in spring 2014, 
for instance, the Department of Justice indicted Chinese military officers for 
cybercrime offenses.65 The litigation was purely symbolic given that “there is 
virtually no chance” China would turn over the indicted officers.66 Similarly, in 
spring 2016, federal prosecutors indicted hackers working for Iran’s Revolutionary 
 
59 Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC v. Hotz, No. 11-cv-0167, 2011 WL 347137, at *1- 2 (N.D. Cal. 
Jan. 27, 2011). 
60 Temporary Restraining Order at 1-2, Mass. Bay Transp. Auth. v. Anderson, No. 08-cv-11364 
(D. Mass. Aug. 9, 2008). 
61 United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525, 529-30, 532 (3d Cir. 2014). The Third Circuit 
subsequently vacated the conviction on venue grounds. Id. at 529. 
62 See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying text. 
63 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
64 See Dierks, supra note 16, at 332-36 (arguing that deterrence has failed in computer crime 
law owing to difficulty in detecting breaches, identifying perpetrators, building a case, and 
encouraging reporting by victims); Skibell, supra note 14, at 935-37 (“Deterrence theory needs to 
account for the empirical evidence that nineteen years under the CFAA has done little to slow the 
growth of computer crime.”); Calkins, supra note 14, at 183-84 (noting practical difficulties in 
enforcing computer crime law). 
65 Indictment, United States v. Dong, Crim. No. 14-118 (W.D. Pa. May 12, 2014); see also Jonathan 
Mayer, Charges Against Chinese, and U.S. Policy on Hacking, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/24/opinion/charges-against-chinese-and-us-policy-on-hacking.html 
[https://perma.cc/2N6V-GZ69]. 
66 Michael S. Schmidt & David E. Sanger, 5 in China Army Face U.S. Charges of Cyberattacks, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/20/us/us-to-charge-chinese-workers-
with-cyberspying.html [https://perma.cc/29L8-V828]. 
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Guard.67 There is little reason to believe that the defendants “will ever appear in 
an American courtroom.”68 Computer security policy should emphasize incentives 
to protect information technology, the thinking goes, and not be chasing after 
predictable, persistent, and extraterritorial attackers. 
Redundant liability is another category of concern from the critical 
perspective. Courts were slow at first in adapting conventional legal doctrines 
to information technology. But as courts have familiarized themselves with 
navigating computer-related disputes, conventional legal doctrines have 
caught up with advances in technology. There is, consequently, a lesser need 
for purpose-built computer causes of action.69 
A final sticking point is the draconian sentencing regime associated with 
cybercrime liability, especially at the federal level.70 This issue gained national 
prominence when federal prosecutors charged Internet activist Aaron Swartz 
with CFAA offenses that carried a maximum sentence of decades in prison.71 
Swartz tragically took his own life rather than stand trial.72 
More recently, a middle school student in Florida logged into his teacher’s 
computer and changed the desktop wallpaper.73 The local sheriff’s department 
charged him with a felony under the state cybercrime statute, carrying an adult 
prison sentence of up to five years.74 
The critical view of cybercrime law has begun to manifest itself in 
legislative proposals. One example is Aaron’s Law, a bipartisan proposal 
introduced in both houses of the current 114th Congress that would curb 
 
67 Indictment, United States v. Fathi, No. 16 Crim. 48 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2016). 
68 David E. Sanger, U.S. Indicts 7 Iranians in Cyberattacks on Banks and a Dam, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/25/world/middleeast/us-indicts-iranians-in-cyber
attacks-on-banks-and-a-dam.html [https://perma.cc/V845-67AC]. 
69 See, e.g., Mark Jaycox, Why the CFAA’s Excessive Criminalization Needs Reform, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 2, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/04/cfaas-excessive-criminalization 
[https://perma.cc/XDH3-UZU3] (identifying numerous overlaps between CFAA and other theories of 
criminal and civil liability). 
70 See Orin Kerr, A Question for Supporters of Increasing Maximum Sentences Under the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 28, 2013, 1:59 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/03/28/a-
question-for-supporters-of-increasing-maximum-sentences-under-the-computer-fraud-and-abuse-act/ 
[https://perma.cc/SJR3-STB5] (“Congress is considering legislation to increase maximum punishments 
under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act . . . . [H]ave there been any cases in which judges maxed out 
the current sentences . . . ?”). 
71 John Schwartz, Internet Activist, a Creator of RSS, Is Dead at 26, Apparently a Suicide, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/13/technology/aaron-swartz-internet-activist-dies-at-
26.html [https://perma/cc/9BBY-77VM]. 
72 Id. 
73 Josh Solomon, Middle School Student Charged with Cybercrime in Holiday, TAMPA BAY TIMES 
(Apr. 9, 2015, 1:05 PM), http://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/crime/middle-school-student-
charged-with-cyber-crime-in-holiday/2224827 [https://perma/cc/F8CD-PD8Z]. 
74 Id. 
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CFAA’s scope and penalties.75 Another bill, proposed in the Senate during 
the 113th Congress, was a comprehensive data protection bill that included a 
provision narrowing CFAA’s scope.76 
The critical perspective on cybercrime law is—like the expansionist 
perspective—not absolutist. Recommendations have centered on reform, rather 
than total repeal.77 Cybercrime law does play a legitimate and important role 
in promoting cybersecurity, the thinking goes. It has just gone too far. 
C. Why Empirical Analyses Are Necessary 
These competing perspectives on cybercrime law are essentially competing 
empirical hypotheses. Proponents of the expansionist perspective do recognize 
the potential for cybercrime litigation abuse. And critics of broad cybercrime 
liability do acknowledge the value of legal remedies against hackers. 
Where the two sides fundamentally part ways is their assessment of the     
on-the-ground, practical impact of cybercrime law. The expansionist hypothesis 
is that “the majority of CFAA cases still involve ‘classic’ hacking activities,”78 
such that cybercrime law primarily functions as a unique and proportional 
response to the most concerning computer abuses. The critical hypothesis is 
that most cases involve minor and technically unsophisticated misconduct, and 
cybercrime law has become redundant and excessively punitive.79 There is no 
abstract means of adjudicating the descriptive accuracy of these competing 
hypotheses. Both sides are facially credible, bolstered by plausible arguments 
 
75 Aaron’s Law Act of 2015, H.R. 1918, 114th Cong. (2015); Aaron’s Law Act of 2015, S. 1030, 
114th Cong. (2015). 
76 Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2014, S. 1897, 113th Cong. §§ 107, 110 (2014). This 
effort draws on an earlier reform amendment sponsored by Senators Grassley, Franken, and Lee. 
See Jake Laperruque & Greg Nojeim, Why Fibbing About Your Age Is Relevant to the Cybersecurity Bill, 
CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (July 30, 2012), https://cdt.org/blog/why-fibbing-about-your-age-
is-relevant-to-the-cybersecurity-bill/ [https://perma.cc/3V7R-WZDA]. A prior version of Senator Leahy’s 
proposal included a more questionable attempt to narrow CFAA. See Orin Kerr, My Assessment of Senator 
Leahy’s Proposed Amendment to the CFAA, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 22, 2011, 5:53 PM), http://
www.volokh.com/2011/11/22/my-assessment-of-senator-leahys-proposed-amendment-to-the-cfaa/ [https://
perma.cc/KM5K-G6KJ] (explaining the prior Leahy proposal and noting that it may be ineffective). 
77 But see Eric Goldman, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Is a Failed Experiment, FORBES 
(Mar. 28, 2013, 4:21 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/03/28/the-computer-
fraud-and-abuse-act-is-a-failed-experiment/ [https://perma/cc/Z8XU-E526] (arguing in favor of 
substantial repeal); Robert Graham, Aaron’s Law: Repeal CFAA Rather Than Amend It, ERRATA 
SECURITY (Jan. 17, 2013), http://blog.erratasec.com/2013/01/aarons-law-get-rid-of-cfaa.html#.
VtYtC5OzLxM [https://perma.cc/4RER-L5AU] (suggesting that total repeal would not create 
additional vulnerabilities or remove penalties for other cybercrimes). 
78 Pacific Aerospace & Elecs., Inc. v. Taylor, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1196 (E.D. Wash. 2003); see 
also supra note 1. 
79 See supra Section I.B. 
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and effective anecdotes. Only data can determine which hypothesis is more 
precise—and so far, data have been entirely missing from the debate. 
The balance of this Article illuminates these competing hypotheses with 
data, providing the first comprehensive empirical analysis of cybercrime 
litigation.80 I focus on CFAA, since it is the best-known and most frequently 
litigated cybercrime statute. 
II. AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF CYBERCRIME LITIGATION 
Section A opens by explaining data sources and methodology. This 
Section assumes that readers have rough familiarity with CFAA’s structure 
and individual offenses. 
Sections B and C begin the descriptive empirical analysis by examining 
longitudinal trends in order to understand the scale and severity of cybercrime 
litigation. Section B reports that civil cybercrime litigation has skyrocketed, 
while the criminal caseload steadily increased but then leveled off in the past 
decade. Section C examines criminal penalties, finding that the mean period of 
incarceration has greatly lengthened, but that the median case still results in no 
prison sentence. 
Section D shifts to detailed latitudinal analysis of fact patterns, 
categorizing the conduct and party relationships that underlie cybercrime 
litigation. The data reflect that most civil cases involve technically 
unsophisticated conduct in the context of a commercial or employment 
dispute. Among criminal cases, the plurality fact pattern merely involves 
government employees misappropriating information. 
Section E examines whether cybercrime law is redundant. Data on civil 
claims suggest that CFAA’s various provisions substantially overlap with 
existing causes of action, which alone are sufficient. Criminal charging data 
are murkier, suggesting that CFAA offenses are somewhat unique—but that 
prosecutors strategically blur theories of liability where sentencing 
enhancements are available. 
Section F takes up the question of deterrence. I compare the federal 
cybercrime caseload to the estimated scope of cybercrime harm and find an 
extraordinary mismatch. There is little cause to believe that cybercrime law 
meaningfully deters sophisticated misconduct. 
 
80 There has been remarkably little quantitative research on cybercrime law. But see Anele 
Nwokoma, Process Evaluation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, 17 PROC. INFO. SYS. 
EDUC. CONF. § 128 (2000) (reporting Department of Justice statistics on CFAA usage); George 
Roach & William J. Michiels, Damages Is the Gatekeeper Issue for Federal Computer Fraud, 8 TUL. J. 
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 61, 62 (2006) (finding that many courts reject civil CFAA claims for 
insufficient “loss” or “damage”); McCullagh, supra note 14 (plotting longitudinal invocation of 
CFAA in federal opinions). 
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Section G closes the analysis by comparing the two high-level hypotheses 
of cybercrime law against the empirical results. I conclude that there is strong 
support for the critical hypothesis as applied to civil litigation. In criminal 
cases, though, I find a more complex picture. There is evidence of overbreadth 
and ineffective deterrence, in line with the critical hypothesis. But there is 
also some evidence of prosecutorial discretion and charge uniqueness, in 
accord with the expansionist hypothesis. 
A. Data Sources and Methodology 
The empirical analysis in this Article draws on data from civil pleadings, criminal 
charging documents, judicial opinions, sentencing records, and news reports. 
Detailed data on civil claims and criminal charges are difficult to obtain. At 
present, there are no means of searching the text of all federal litigation filings. 
To build a comprehensive latitudinal dataset of civil pleadings and criminal 
charging documents,81 I began with expansive keyword searches on Bloomberg 
Law and Westlaw for CFAA-related court filings.82 Next, I augmented the 
results with charging materials from Department of Justice public 
announcements. I then manually winnowed the documents, labeling each with 
CFAA claims/charges,83 non-CFAA claims/charges, party/victim relationships, 
and underlying conduct.84 In total, I reviewed approximately 600 court filings 
(about 20,000 pages). The complete civil dataset included 325 pleadings and 
the criminal dataset included 106 charging documents and 133 defendants.85 
Both datasets are open and available online for future research use.86 
Aggregate longitudinal data on judicial opinions are drawn directly from 
Westlaw. I used keyword searches to identify CFAA opinions,87 then 
extracted Westlaw’s ordinary fields for date, court, and parties. 
 
81 This project began in mid-2013. I selected 2012 as the last complete calendar year of court filings. 
82 Specifically, I used the query: (“computer fraud”) OR (“18 U.S.C. 1030”) OR (“18 USC 
1030”) OR (“18 U.S.C. § 1030”) OR (“18 USC § 1030”) OR (“18:1030”) OR (“fraud activity 
connected with computers”) OR (“unauthorized access to a computer”). The latter two phrases are 
commonly used on criminal dockets involving a CFAA charge. 
83 Many filings are imprecise about the specific CFAA cause of action. Where a filing was not explicit, 
I attempted to infer the relevant subsections by comparing the text of the filing to the text of the statute. 
84 There is, to be sure, no neat taxonomy of party relationships and underlying conduct. I made 
an initial review of the documents to discern the most common fact patterns, then applied those 
categories in a second review. 
85 Given the volume of civil pleadings, I did not filter out multiple filings from the same proceeding. 
For criminal charging documents, by contrast, I located the latest document for each proceeding. 
86 The civil dataset is available at https://perma.cc/5JM2-XQG9 [hereinafter Civil Dataset]. 
The criminal dataset is available at https://perma.cc/U75B=XHZW [hereinafter Criminal Dataset]. 
87 Since I did not manually confirm that each opinion concerned a CFAA theory, I used a 
narrower search query than for pleadings: “computer fraud and abuse.” The results under this 
methodology, to be sure, include false positives and negatives. Aggregate figures on judicial opinions 
should be considered as estimates, reflective of trends in federal litigation. 
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Finally, aggregate criminal longitudinal data were obtained from the 
Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics and the TRACfed 
Criminal Enforcement project at Syracuse University.88 
B. What Is the Volume of Cybercrime Litigation? 
Understanding the longitudinal dynamics of cybercrime litigation is a 
critical first-order matter. First, the volume of litigation is informative as to 
whether cybercrime statutes merit scholarly, judicial, and policymaker 
attention. If cybercrime litigation were exceedingly rare, subsidiary issues 
would largely become moot. 
A second reason for beginning with longitudinal analysis is to understand 
how litigation practices have changed. An abrupt uptick in civil or criminal 
litigation constitutes a warning sign, suggestive of strategic statutory abuse. 
And, in criminal cases, a tapering off is suggestive of limited investigatory 
resources or capabilities. 
The following subsections examine longitudinal trends for civil and 
criminal cybercrime litigation, respectively. 
1. Civil Litigation 
Civil cybercrime litigation has unambiguously exploded. Congress first 
enacted a private cause of action in 1994; for approximately the first decade 
of its existence, CFAA lay relatively fallow as a civil recourse. Then, between 
2002 and 2012, district court opinions surged by over an order of magnitude.89 
The federal appellate courts have also been reviewing civil CFAA disputes at 
an increasing rate.90  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
88  Criminal Enforcement, TRACFED, http://tracfed.syr.edu/ [https://perma.cc/B2GQ-TS5Z] 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2016); Federal Criminal Case Processing Statistics, BUREAU JUST. STAT., 
http://www.bjs.gov/fjsrc/ [https://perma.cc/UE5K-AYSD] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016). The two 
datasets use slightly different means of classifying prosecutions: the DOJ Bureau of Justice Statistics 
dataset reports all defendants with a CFAA charge, while the TRACFed dataset reports only 
defendants where prosecutors noted a “lead” CFAA charge. Also, the DOJ BJS dataset only offers 
annual summary statistics, rather than individual case tracking. In order to associate prosecutions, 
convictions, and sentences in both datasets, I make the simplifying assumption that all three stages 
of litigation are contemporaneous. 
89 See infra Figure 1. 
90 See infra Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: Federal Court Opinions – Civil  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The uptick in civil CFAA litigation is not cabined by geography. Private 
cybercrime claims are on the rise in federal district courts and in every 
regional court of appeals, with the sole exception of the D.C. Circuit.91 
 
Figure 2: Federal District Court Opinions – Civil, by Circuit 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
91 See infra Figure 2. 
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 This sudden surge in civil cybercrime litigation suggests that cases are 
motivated by shifts in litigation strategy, rather than shifts in the underlying 
cybercrime problem.92 Given that cybercrime has also rapidly increased, 
though, the evidence is hardly conclusive. Section D returns to the issue of 
civil cybercrime litigation with a detailed latitudinal analysis of pleadings. 
The trend in civil cybercrime litigation is notably reminiscent of the 
federal courts’ experience with the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations (RICO) Act.93 In the years immediately following its 
enactment, plaintiffs simply ignored the statute; during the first decade, there 
were just nine published opinions addressing civil claims under the Act.94 In 
the following three years, however, courts published over 200 civil RICO 
opinions.95 Strategic litigants recognized that conventional commercial 
disputes—with no nexus whatsoever to organized crime—could be 
transmuted into federal claims, with potential for recovering treble damages 
and attorneys’ fees.96 
2. Criminal Litigation 
Since federal criminal cases are often resolved without substantial judicial 
intervention, opinions in criminal CFAA matters are rare. Nevertheless, as 
with civil litigation, trial and appellate courts are increasingly addressing 
criminal issues under CFAA, as demonstrated in Figure 3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
92 The growth in CFAA litigation is difficult to attribute to expanded statutory scope. 
Congress substantially expanded CFAA liability in 1996, nearly a decade before the litigation boom. 
93 See Michael Goldsmith & Penrod W. Keith, Civil RICO Abuse: The Allegations in Context, 
1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 55, 62-66 (describing the rise in civil RICO litigation and providing data); see 
also Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 19-23 (2002) (providing more recent data 
on civil RICO litigation). 
94 Goldsmith & Keith, supra note 93, at 63, 64 n.38. 
95 Id. at 64 n.38. 
96 Cf. Nick Akerman, CFAA Resembles RICO, NAT’L L.J. (Aug. 29, 2005), http://www.
nationallawjournal.com/id=900005435711/CFAA-Resembles-RICO [https://perma.cc/BQ5B-TSAJ] 
(“As with civil RICO, litigators can no longer overlook the CFAA. Whenever the evidence reflects 
that computers are involved in the perpetrating of a wrong, the CFAA should be reviewed for 
potential claims. The advantages are obvious. Like RICO, the CFAA is a federal statute and thus 
provides automatic federal jurisdiction, when the only available claims might be based on state law 
with no diversity jurisdiction. The CFAA also has certain advantages over using RICO (albeit 
without the treble damages and attorney fees mandated by RICO).”). 
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Figure 3: Federal Court Opinions – Criminal  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Longitudinal datasets on prosecutorial practice confirm a brisk upswing 
in cybercrime charging, between the late 1990s and early 2000s. Then, from 
the mid-2000s on, cybercrime charging leveled off.97 
Figure 4: Federal Criminal Prosecutions  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data on convictions closely parallel the trends in data on charging—rapid 
growth from the 1990s to 2000s, then little change.98 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
97 See infra Figure 4. 
98 See infra Figure 5.  
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Figure 5: Federal Criminal Convictions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The increase in criminal prosecutions and convictions, while significant, 
is not nearly as abrupt or substantial as the apparent increase in civil 
litigation. The data, therefore, provide little basis on which to assess the 
charging practices of federal prosecutors. Understanding the dynamics of 
criminal litigation instead requires exploration of further case detail, as 
provided in the following Parts. 
Several additional observations warrant mention. First, the surge in 
criminal litigation predated the surge in civil litigation by about a decade. The 
differing sources of longitudinal data can explain a year or two of discrepancy—
the civil data are drawn exclusively from opinions, not preliminary filings—but 
not so wide a span. This result suggests that prosecutors initially paved the way 
for broad applicability of cybercrime law, and civil litigants only later took 
advantage.99 
Another significant result is that the volumes of cybercrime prosecutions 
and convictions have remained nearly constant for almost a decade. Given 
that the cybercrime problem has continued to grow, this trend suggests that 
prosecutors have reached the limit of their capacity for pursuing cybercrime 
cases. The longitudinal data do not lend insight, though, into whether that 
limit arises from fundamental challenges in investigating and prosecuting 
cybercrime, or from artificial personnel and resource constraints. 
Finally, there is a persistent gap between cybercrime prosecutions and 
convictions. Roughly a quarter of filed charges do not result in a successful 
criminal justice outcome. According to Department of Justice data, a share of 
these cases can be attributed to acquittal, dismissal, or diversion.100 The majority, 
though, appear to result from defendants who are either unidentifiable or outside 
the reach of the United States criminal justice system. 
 
99 Cf. Goldsmith & Keith, supra note 93, at 62-64 (suggesting that criminal prosecutors took 
advantage of RICO’s broad provisions slightly before civil plaintiffs). 
100 See infra Figure 7 and accompanying text. 
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C. How Punitive Are Cybercrime Prosecutions? 
A cursory analysis would suggest that sentencing under cybercrime law has 
become radically more punitive. A defendant in a concluded prosecution for a 
federal cybercrime offense in the 2010s will, on average, receive a sentence of 
incarceration about four to five times longer than a defendant in the 1990s, as 
shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: Mean Prison Sentence in Closed Prosecutions (Months) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This account, however, proves to be far too simplistic. Most convicted 
cybercrime defendants do not receive a prison sentence; instead, most receive 
probation, a fine, a suspended sentence, or no sentence at all.101 Furthermore, a 
small fraction of defendants avoid conviction altogether, obtaining dismissal, 
pretrial diversion, or acquittal.102 
 
Figure 7: Sentencing for Convicted Defendants (DOJ BJS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
101 See infra Figure 8. 
102 See infra Figure 7. 
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Figure 8: Outcomes in Closed Prosecutions (DOJ BJS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, the ratio of convicted defendants 
who received a prison sentence roughly doubled, reaching two in five.103 But 
since then, the ratio has remained roughly constant.104 
So, if the median convicted defendant continues to receive no prison 
sentence, and if the proportion of convicted defendants who receive a prison 
sentence has remained steady, why are average cybercrime prison sentences 
continuing to increase? One possible explanation is that federal prosecutors 
have been successful at targeting major cybercriminals, such that a small 
number of outliers are driving up the average. 
 
Figure 9: Prison Sentence, If Any (TRACFED, Months) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
103 See supra Figure 8. 
104 See supra Figure 8. 
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The data tell a different story. Since the mid-2000s, prosecutors have 
occasionally secured convictions against serious offenders. But there is not a 
burgeoning number of outlier sentences; cybercrime sentencing has remained 
clustered.105 Rather, the entire set of cybercrime prison sentences appears to 
have been indiscriminately shifted upwards over the past decade, roughly 
tripling the average period of incarceration.106 
These observations about sentencing practices cut in opposite directions. 
On the one hand, the data imply that federal prosecutors are exercising 
meaningful discretion in cybercrime cases. Scholars and practitioners have 
emphasized how broad felony offenses and elevated sentencing guidelines 
facilitate imposing incarceration.107 But the data reflect that prosecutors 
generally remain willing to accept minimal, nonprison punishments. 
On the other hand, cybercrime prosecutorial discretion is increasingly 
bimodal. Where prosecutors do seek and obtain a prison sentence, the period 
of incarceration has greatly increased. In the 1990s, a cybercrime prison term 
of less than one year was customary; now, it is a rarity. 
The most surprising result is just how few defendants are sentenced to prison. 
Incarceration serves as a proxy variable for offense severity; where prosecutors 
seek and judges impose a nonprison sentence, the underlying computer abuse is 
likely minimal. This observation suggests that most federal prosecutions arise 
from minor misconduct, not high-profile, large-scale, or sophisticated hacking. 
 
105 See supra Figure 9.  
106 See supra Figure 9. 
107 One manner in which a minor CFAA offense can be converted into a felony is by 
incorporating a violation of state cybercrime law. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(2)(B)(ii) (2012); see Orin Kerr, 
Obama’s Proposed Changes to the Computer Hacking Statute, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 14, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/14/obamas-proposed-changes-
to-the-computer-hacking-statute-a-deep-dive/ [https://perma.cc/2465-PTZ2] (explaining how state 
cybercrime statutes often overlap with CFAA); Zoe Lofgren & Ron Wyden, Introducing Aaron’s Law, 
A Desperately Needed Reform of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, WIRED (June 20, 2013), 
http://www.wired.com/2013/06/aarons-law-is-finally-here/ [https://perma.cc /C8AL-UC26] (noting 
that “a prosecutor can seek to inflate potential sentences by stacking new charges atop violations of 
state laws”). Another avenue for converting a minor CFAA offense into a felony is to charge the 
expansive fraud provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4), or one of the damage provisions, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1030(a)(5)(A)-(C). For an explanation about how sentencing enhancement factors can easily apply 
in cybercrime cases, see Hanni Fakhoury, How the Sentencing Guidelines Work Against Defendants in 
CFAA Cases, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.: DEEPLINKS BLOG (Apr. 9, 2013), https://
www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/03/41-months-weev-understanding-how-sentencing-guidelines-work-cfaa-
cases-0 [https://perma.cc/U3PC-R9YF] (critiquing the use of an enhancement factor targeted 
specifically at CFAA crimes). 
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D. What Fact Patterns Are Litigated Under Cybercrime Law? 
The longitudinal data are probative of how civil plaintiffs and criminal 
prosecutors have invoked cybercrime law, but they are certainly not 
conclusive. In this Section, I turn to a detailed latitudinal analysis, using a 
new, comprehensive dataset of 2012 federal cybercrime pleadings. 
With this novel dataset, it is possible to definitively answer additonal 
foundational questions about the function of federal cybercrime law: Who 
invokes CFAA and under what circumstances? The following subsections 
examine these questions, first for civil litigation, then for criminal prosecutions. 
1. Civil Litigation 
a. Party Relationships 
 Civil defendants appear nothing like the outsider rogues that initially 
captivated Congress and state legislatures, as demonstrated by Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Party Relationships in Civil CFAA Filings 
 
Relationship Between Plaintiff(s) 
and Defendant(s) 
Number of 
Filings 
Employee, Consultant, or Contractor 162 (50%)
Competitor 97 (30%)
Technology Service Provider 42 (13%)
Derivative Business 29 (9%)
Business Partner 24 (7%)
Doe(s) 22 (7%)
No Substantial Relationship 16 (5%)
Customer or User 8 (2%)
Employer 6 (2%)  
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 The overwhelming majority of private cybercrime claims arise in business 
disputes (238, 73%),108 and of those, most follow from previous employment (168, 
52%).109 Just a small minority of claims (38, 12%) are filed against strangers.110 
An analysis of party relationship coincidence confirms that cybercrime 
law most often intermediates routine commercial quarrels. There is scant 
overlap between categories associated with business and those associated with 
hacker stereotypes; these are not cases in which former employees or 
competitors have aligned with unrelated, serial computer abusers. Rather, 
civil CFAA litigation involves one-off commercial disputes that happen to 
involve information technology. 
 
Table 2: Party Relationship Coincidence in Civil CFAA Filings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The data on party relationships, seen in Table 2, reveal a notable trend in 
litigation: a cybercrime claim against a competitor is often accompanied by a 
cybercrime claim against a former employee (76, 78%).111 These cases reflect 
departed staff who have either established their own firms or joined preexisting 
competitors. Cybercrime law is merely a novel federal twist in these cases, which 
have historically been adjudicated under contract, trade secret, or agency law. 
b. Underlying Conduct 
The overwhelming majority of civil cybercrime claims also look nothing 
like “hacking,” even construed broadly, as shown in Table 3.  
 
108 Civil Dataset, supra note 86 ((Business Dispute) / (All Civil Filings)). In describing the 
latitudinal data throughout this Article, I use the following logic notation to reflect operations on 
the civil and criminal datasets: (1) “∧” for “and,” (2) “∨” for “or,” and (3) “¬” for “
not.” The symbol “/” represents division of the sum of records matching the numerator by the sum of 
records matching the denominator. The symbol “–” represents the difference between the sum of records 
matching the minuend and the sum of records matching the subtrahend. 
109 See id. ((Business Dispute ∧ Employee, Consultant, Contractor, or Distributor) / (Business 
Dispute)). 
110 See id. ((Unrelated Parties) / (All Civil Filings)). 
111 See id. ((Competitor ∧ Employee, Consultant, Contractor, or Distributor) / (Competitor)). 
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Table 3: Conduct Alleged in Civil CFAA Filings 
 
Conduct Number of Filings 
Misappropriating Information 170 (52%)
Editing or Deleting Information 71 (22%)
Invasion of Privacy 41 (13%)
Accessing Another Person’s Account 40 (12%)
Financial Misfeasance 26 (8%)
Hijacking Another Person’s Account 26 (8%)
Impersonation 20 (6%)
Misappropriating a Computer System 18 (6%)
Mobile Phone Unlocking 16 (5%)
Software Disruption of a Computer System 14 (4%)
Credential Sharing 11 (3%)
Harassment 11 (3%)
Unrelated Website 9 (3%)
Copyright Trolling 8 (2%)
Spam Calls or Email 7 (2%)
Malware 6 (2%)
Reverse Engineering 6 (2%)
Physical Disruption of a Computer System 5 (2%)
Automated Website Interaction 5 (2%)
Modifications to Enterprise Software 5 (2%)
 
Most private claims relate to information misappropriation (170, 52%),112 
or modification or deletion (71, 22%).113 The categories substantially overlap, 
and together represent a majority of claims (182, 56%).114 These findings 
indicate that civil cybercrime works as a quasi-intellectual property regime, 
far less concerned with the function and integrity of computer systems than 
with their information contents. 
Only a minority of claims could be reasonably characterized as involving 
the circumvention of a technical protection measure (99, 30%).115 Furthermore, 
even within these cases that involve technical circumvention, the most common 
avenues for unauthorized access are password theft (53, 54%),116 mobile phone 
 
112 See id. ((Misappropriating Information) / (All Civil Filings)).  
113 See id. ((Editing or Deleting Information) / (All Civil Filings)). 
114 See id. ((Misappropriating Information ∨	Editing or Deleting Information) / (All Civil Filings). 
115 See id. ((Circumvention of a Technical Protection) / (All Civil Filings)).  
116 See id. ((Circumvention of a Technical Protection ∧ Accessing or Hijacking Another Person's 
Account – Circumvention of a Technical Protection ∧ Accessing or Hijacking Another Person's Account 
with a Technical Circumvention Except Credentials) / (Circumvention of a Technical Protection)).  
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unlocking (16, 16%),117 and password sharing (11, 11%).118 Civil cybercrime 
cases, in short, do not arise from technically sophisticated “breaking and 
entering.”119 
There is remarkably little commonality in the long tail of fact patterns. 
Claims present a hodgepodge of theories favoring liability, ranging from 
online harassment (11, 3%)120 to hosting an unrelated website (9, 3%)121 to 
scraping online material (5, 2%).122 Cybercrime use in copyright trolling (8, 
2%)123 and bulk mobile phone unlocking cases (16, 5%)124 suggests the law has 
been opportunistically seized upon for non-adversarial litigation.125 
2. Criminal Litigation 
a. Victim–Defendant Relationships 
Most criminal charges, like most civil claims, arise from a preexisting 
relationship, as shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Victim-Defendant Relationships in CFAA Prosecutions126 
 
Relationship Between Defendant and Victim Number of Defendants 
Employee, Consultant, or Contractor 64 (48%)
No Substantial Relationship 41 (30%)
Colleague 9 (7%)
Social or Familial Relation 5 (4%)
Technology Service 5 (4%)
Business Partner 4 (3%)
Customer or User 3 (2%)
Doe(s) 3 (2%)
 
 
117 See id. ((Circumvention of a Technical Protection ∧ Mobile Phone Unlocking) / (Circumvention 
of a Technical Protection)).  
118 See id. ((Circumvention of a Technical Protection ∧ Credential Sharing) / (Circumvention of a 
Technical Protection)). 
119 Contra H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 20 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 3706 
(“The conduct prohibited [in CFAA] is analogous to that of ‘breaking and entering’ rather than 
using a computer (similar to the use of a gun) in committing the offense.”). 
120 See Civil Dataset, supra note 86 ((Harassment) / (All Civil Filings)).  
121 See id. ((Unrelated Website) / (All Civil Filings)).  
122 See id. ((Automated Website Interaction) / (All Civil Filings)).  
123 See id. ((Copyright Trolling) / (All Civil Filings)).  
124 See id. ((Mobile Phone Unlocking) / (All Civil Filings)).  
125 See generally Civil Dataset, supra note 86. 
126 Criminal Dataset, supra note 86. 
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And, like with civil claims, the majority of criminal charges relate to an 
employment or commercial dispute (76, 57%).127 
These findings squarely deflate the myth that most cybercrime defendants 
align with hacker archetypes (i.e., repeat offenders motivated by sport, profit, or 
national pride). Instead, most criminal cases arise from one-time misconduct, in 
which an underlying dispute migrates from the real world to the Internet. 
The criminal prosecution data reveal, however, one notable departure 
from civil practice: although still a minority, cases in which there is no 
relationship between the defendant and victim, or where the defendant is 
unidentified, occur about three times as often in criminal prosecutions as in 
civil suits (44, 33%).128 
b. Underlying Conduct 
Criminal cases, much like civil cases, tend not to arise from sophisticated 
hacking, as seen in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Conduct Alleged in Criminal CFAA Filings 129 
Conduct    Number of  
 Defendants
Misappropriating Information 82 (62%)
Accessing Another Person’s Account 47 (35%)
Financial Misfeasance 32 (24%)
Editing or Deleting Information 18 (14%)
Malware 17 (13%)
Software Disruption of a Computer System 14 (11%)
Unspecified Breaking In 13 (10%)
Hijacking Another Person’s Account 11 (8%)
 
About half of prosecutions do not involve technical circumvention of an 
access control (65, 49%).130 And, among those cases that do involve a 
circumvention of a technological protection, many of the fact patterns do not 
reflect technical sophistication but rather password theft (32, 47%).131 
 
127 See id. ((Employee, Consultant, Contractor, or Distributor ∨ Business Partner ∨ Colleague ∨ 
Customer or User ∨ Competitor) / (All Criminal Defendants)).  
128 See id. ((Doe(s) ∨ No Substantial Relationship) / (All Criminal Defendants)).	 
129 Criminal Dataset, supra note 86. 
130  See id. ((All Criminal Defendants – Circumvention of a Technical Protection) / (All Criminal 
Defendants)). 
131 See id. ((Circumvention of a Technical Protection – Circumvention of a Technical Protection 
Except Credentials) / (Circumvention of a Technical Protection)).  
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These results belie the narrative that federal prosecutors generally reserve 
cybercrime charges for the worst offenders, namely serial and sophisticated 
computer hackers.132 In fact, prosecutors routinely file cybercrime charges for 
minor misconduct, especially when a current or former employee misappropriates 
information (51, 39%).133 
One substantial point of divergence between civil and criminal litigation is 
the extent to which government computer systems are involved. Nearly all the 
civil cases in the dataset related to computer systems owned by private 
individuals or businesses.134 In the criminal cases, by contrast, roughly a quarter 
of charges related to a government computer system (38, 29%).135 Most of the 
defendants in these cases were current or former government employees who 
had technically valid credentials for a system, but misused the system (21, 
55%).136 Remarkably, among those cases where a government employee 
repurposed their access to a workplace computer system, the most common 
class of defendant consisted of law enforcement personnel (12, 57%).137 
E. Is Cybercrime Law Redundant? 
Cybercrime law is not monolithic. Federal and state legislatures have 
enacted a diverse array of offenses and have drafted those offenses with a wide 
range of textual variations.138 The current CFAA, for instance, contains 
(depending on how one counts) up to fourteen different statutory offenses.139 
The structure of cybercrime law generates the potential for two different 
types of redundancy. First, a cybercrime offense might be internally redundant, 
 
132 But cf. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Washington Jenny A. Durkan Testifies 
Before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism, JUST. NEWS (May 8, 2013), http://
www.justice.gov/opa/speech/us-attorney-western-district-washington-jenny-durkan-testifies-senate-judiciary 
[https://perma.cc/25MF-TZCB] (highlighting federal prosecutorial successes in cybercrime cases despite the 
“increases in the skills of threat actors and the complexity of their organizations”). 
133 See Criminal Dataset, supra note 86 ((Employee, Consultant, Contractor, or Distributor ∧ 
Misappropriating Information) / (All Criminal Defendants)).  
134  Civil Dataset, supra note 86. 
135 See Criminal Dataset, supra note 86 ((Government Computer System) / (All                                                         
Criminal Defendants)).  
136 See id. ((Government Computer System ∧ Misappropriating Information ∧ ¬ (Circumvention 
of a Technical Protection)) / (Government Computer System)).	 
137 See id. ((Government Computer System ∧ Misappropriating Information ∧ ¬ (Circumvention 
of a Technical Protection) ∧  Law Enforcement Personnel) / (Government Computer System ∧ 
Misappropriating Information ∧ ¬ (Circumvention of a Technical Protection)). 
138 See, e.g., Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., No. C 08-05780, 2010 WL 3291750, at *9-
12 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2010) (holding that “permission” under the California cybercrime statute has 
a different meaning than “authorization” under the federal statute); see also United States v. 
Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525, 534 n.5 (3d Cir. 2014) (suggesting that “without authorization, or in 
excess of authorization” under the New Jersey statute has a different meaning than “without 
authorization or exceeds authorized access” under the federal statute). 
139 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). 
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overlapping with other cybercrime offenses within the same statutory scheme. 
Second, a cybercrime offense might be externally redundant, overlapping with 
noncybercrime civil claims or criminal charges. 
This Section examines the extent to which cybercrime is both internally and 
externally redundant. It begins with civil claims before turning to criminal charges. 
1. Civil Litigation 
a. Internal Redundancy 
Many pleadings invoke cybercrime law only generally and fail to identify 
particular statutory claims (123, 38%).140 These plaintiffs treat CFAA as a 
single type of liability, blurring the various offenses. One plausible 
interpretation is that attorneys simply fail to understand the federal statute’s 
structure. Alternatively, practitioners may view cybercrime law as so 
internally duplicative that particularized claiming is unnecessary. A more 
cynical view is that many courts tolerate this vague pleading practice, thus 
providing little incentive for plaintiffs to furnish detail. 
CFAA’s structure provides a limited natural experiment for evaluating 
whether attorneys are confused by the statutory scheme or are pleading 
strategically. In civil practice, statutory claims for unintentional damage to a 
computer are markedly easier to prove than claims for reckless damage to a 
computer, and both claims provide identical remedies.141 Nevertheless, a     
nontrivial share of filings (55, 27%) include a reckless damage claim.142 Most 
of these pleadings also include an unintentional damage claim (42, 76%), such 
that the reckless damage claim is merely duplicative.143 But a meaningful 
share of reckless damage pleadings do not include an unintentional damage 
claim (13, 24%),144 a result that can only be explained by attorney confusion. 
So, this much is certain: a fair number of practitioners are befuddled by 
cybercrime law. 
Within the subset of filings that are more precise about statutory claims 
(202, 62%),145 a substantial majority reference multiple provisions (142, 70%), 
as shown in Figure 10. 
 
 
 
140 See Criminal Dataset, supra note 86 ((Unspecified Claims / All Civil Claims)). 
141 CFAA plaintiffs usually must show $5000 in “loss” under 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (g) and 
(c)(4)(A)(i)(I). As a result, in civil cases, the reckless “damage” offense in (a)(5)(B) is ordinarily 
strictly harder to prove than the “damage and loss” offense in (a)(5)(C). 
142 See infra Table 6 ((1030(a)(5)(B) / (All Civil Claims)). 
143 See infra Table 7 ((1030(a)(5)(B) ∧ 1030(a)(5)(C) / (1030(a)(5)(B)).	 
144 See id. ((1030(a)(5)(B) ∧ ¬ 1030(a)(5)(C)) / (1030(a)(5)(B).  
145 See Civil Dataset, supra note 86 ((¬ Unspecified CFAA Claims) / (All Civil Claims)).  
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Figure 10: Number of Specific CFAA Provisions in Civil Filings  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 These findings strongly suggest that CFAA’s various provisions greatly 
overlap. Most plaintiffs who plead with specificity believe their fact pattern 
could be styled as a violation of more than one statutory offense. 
Pleadings most commonly cite CFAA’s taking information and fraud 
offenses, as would be expected given their broad judicial constructions.146 The 
unintentional damage and loss provision is also widely invoked, suggesting 
plaintiffs recognize the broad and overlapping interpretations of “damage” 
and “loss” that some courts have adopted. 
 
Table 6: Frequency of Specific CFAA Provisions in Civil Filings 
 
     Civil Claim        Statutory 
     Provision  
Filings with 
a Claim
Taking Information (a)(2)(C) 136 (67%)
Fraud (a)(4) 111 (55%)
Damage and Loss (a)(5)(C) 96 (48%)
Reckless Damage (a)(5)(B) 55 (27%)
Intentional Damage (a)(5)(A) 48 (24%)
Trafficking in Passwords (a)(6)(A) 23 (11%)
Unspecified Damage (a)(5) 18 (9%)
Taking Financial Information (a)(2)(A) 4 (2%)
Extortion (a)(7) 2 (1%)
 
 
146 As an aside, CFAA incorporates an unusual cause of action for password trafficking, and 
plaintiffs have found a way to put even this to use. Most of these cases arise from mobile phone 
unlocking (13, 57%) or voluntary password sharing (6, 26%). Id. ((1030(a)(6)(A) ∧ Mobile Phone 
Unlocking) / (1030(a)(6)(A))); id. ((1030(a)(6)(A) ∧ Credential Sharing) / (1030(a)(6)(A))). 
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Claiming coincidence under CFAA lends further credence to the view 
that the statute is internally redundant, as seen in Table 7. There are 
extraordinarily high rates of coclaiming across CFAA’s broadest provisions. 
 
Table 7: Coincidence of Specific CFAA Provisions in Civil Filings 
(18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2012)) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Several areas of claiming coincidence warrant note. First, the taking 
information and fraud offenses frequently coincide,147 likely because courts 
have watered down key elements of CFAA’s fraud offense. 
Second, the various “damage” claims commonly are coupled with a taking 
information or a fraud claim.148 These filings reflect jurisprudence that broadly 
interprets “damage” to encompass mundane copying or modifying data.149 
Third, the overwhelming majority of password trafficking claims are 
paired with fraud claims (20, 87%).150 Much, but not all, of the overlap arises 
from copy-and-paste complaints in mobile phone unlocking disputes (13, 
65%).151 The theory of these cases seems to be, in part, that use of another 
person’s password is inherently fraudulent. If viable, this theory renders the 
password trafficking offense largely redundant as against the fraud offense. 
b. External Redundancy 
Private cybercrime claims are usually bundled with a passel of other 
causes of action, as shown in Figure 11. 
 
 
147 See supra Table 7. 
148 See supra Table 7. 
149 Civil Dataset, supra note 86. Measured slightly differently, within the subset of filings that 
included any (a)(5) claim (137, 68%), a slight majority involved information misappropriation, 
modification, or deletion (69, 50%). 
150 See id. ((1030(a)(6)(A) ∧ 1030(a)(4)) / (1030(a)(6)(A))).	 
151 See id. ((1030(a)(6)(A) ∧ 1030(a)(4) ∧ Mobile Phone Unlocking) / (1030(a)(6)(A) ∧ 
1030(a)(4))).  
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Figure 11: Number of Non-CFAA Claims in Civil Filings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This high rate of coclaiming buttresses the theory that, in civil litigation, 
CFAA and conventional bases of liability are usually redundant. Plaintiffs 
evidently believe they have a broad range of colorable theories for recovery. 
As demonstrated in Table 8, the most frequent cybercrime coclaims are 
broad, state common law causes of action. 
 
Table 8: Frequency of Non-CFAA Claims in Civil Filings 
 
Non-CFAA Claim Source of 
Law
 Filings with 
a Claim
Contract State 161 (50%)
Unfair Business Practices State 138 (42%)
Trade Secret State 131 (40%)
Conversion State 126 (39%)
Tortious Interference State 125 (38%)
Fiduciary Duty State 115 (35%)
Unjust Enrichment State 89 (27%)
Civil Conspiracy State 86 (26%)
Stored Communications Act Federal 67 (21%)
Computer Trespass State 63 (19%)
Fraud State 62 (19%)
Trademark Federal 56 (17%)
Wiretap Act Federal 54 (16%)
Trespass to Chattels State 44 (14%)
Copyright Federal 36 (11%)
Privacy Tort State 27 (8%)
Defamation State 21 (6%)
Negligence State 17 (5%)
Wiretap Statute State 15 (5%)
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 This result is consistent with the theory that courts have adapted 
conventional tort and property claims to technology, making dedicated, 
computer-specific causes of action less necessary. 
The leading civil coclaims also reinforce the conclusion that civil cybercrime 
mediates commercial grievances, not sophisticated computer intrusions. Claims 
grounded in contract, unfair business practices, and fiduciary duty appear in the 
overwhelming majority of civil cybercrime cases152—and necessarily arise from 
business and employment relationships.153 
Comparing claiming coincidence across CFAA and non-CFAA causes of 
action reveals that this external redundancy is not unique to specific 
cybercrime offenses, as demonstrated by Table 9. 
 
Table 9: Coincidence Between the Most Common CFAA  
and Non-CFAA Claims in Civil Filings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Litigants invoke the same state common law causes of action, regardless of 
whether their cybercrime claim arises from a taking information, fraud, or 
damage theory.154 
A final observation is how many cases are in federal court solely based on 
a CFAA claim. A slight majority of filings do not include any federal claim 
other than CFAA (166, 51%).155 While plaintiffs in some of these cases could 
assuredly invoke diversity jurisdiction, the high proportion strongly implies 
that many CFAA plaintiffs rely upon the statute as a hook for federal subject 
matter jurisdiction, and many of these disputes would end up in state court 
but for CFAA.156 
 
152 See infra Table 9. 
153 Claims for trade secret theft, conversion, and tortious interference suggest an underlying 
commercial dispute, but are not so conclusive. A hacker breaching a system and obtaining 
information could be liable under trade secret or conversion theories for misappropriating 
confidential business information. An intentional disruption of a commercial computer system could 
be actionable as tortious interference since the aim is interfering with ongoing and prospective 
business operations. 
154 Civil Dataset, supra note 86. 
155 Id. ((¬Other Federal Claims) / (All Civil Claims)). 
156 Some courts have recognized CFAA usage as a strategic mechanism for federal subject 
matter jurisdiction and have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over associated state law 
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2. Criminal Prosecutions 
a. Internal Redundancy 
At first glance, CFAA’s internal redundancy appears significantly less 
pronounced in criminal prosecutions than in civil cases.157 Prosecutors 
uniformly reference specific provisions of CFAA, and the overwhelming 
majority of defendants are accused of violating just one of CFAA’s statutory 
offenses (100, 75%), as illustrated by Figure 12. 
 
 
Figure 12: Number of Specific CFAA Provisions in Criminal Prosecutions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prosecutors thus appear to be exercising restraint in cybercrime cases. 
Even in fact patterns where judicial constructions of CFAA would allow for 
charging under multiple statutory provisions, prosecutors rarely invoke more 
than one type of offense. The result also suggests that prosecutors make a 
meaningful effort to distinguish between various cybercrime offenses. 
There is, though, a cynical alternative reading of this result. Prosecutors 
can already easily obtain a maximum five-year sentence under CFAA’s broad 
taking-information provision.158 An additional conviction for fraud or damage 
would likely carry the same maximum sentence and would be subject to the 
 
claims. See, e.g., Landmark Credit Union v. Doberstein, 746 F. Supp. 2d 990, 993-94 (E.D. Wis. 
2010) (stating that plaintiff ’s claim “borders on the frivolous” and is “an attempt to artificially create 
federal jurisdiction”); Contemporary Serv. Corp. v. Hartman, No. 08-02967, 2008 WL 3049891, at 
*3-4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2008) (discussing the differences in what plaintiffs must prove for CFAA 
claims in comparison to state law claims). 
157 This criminal charging analysis provides equivalent treatment to principal, attempt, 
accomplice, and conspiracy charges under each CFAA provision, since the purpose of the analysis 
is to compare the scope and invocation of CFAA’s various provisions. 
158 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(2)(B) (2012) (setting a five-year maximum sentence for CFAA’s 
taking information offenses, so long as prosecutors can establish any of several straightforward 
enhancements). 
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same sentencing guidelines. And, since the charges arise from the same 
conduct, sentences would likely run concurrently.159 Additionally, if the 
underlying theories for various offenses overlap too extensively, courts might 
invalidate the charges on Double Jeopardy Clause grounds.160 Accordingly, if 
prosecutors make charging determinations to obtain the greatest possible 
punishment, they would have little incentive to charge under multiple CFAA 
provisions. Prosecutors would instead charge under just the offense that is 
both the easiest to prove and most punitive.161 
Results on charging coincidence (Table 10) do not, unfortunately, aid in 
selecting between these competing hypotheses of prosecutorial behavior. 
 
Table 10: Coincidence of Specific CFAA Provisions in Criminal 
Prosecutions (18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2012)) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As seen in Table 10, there are generally low levels of charging coincidence 
across the statutory provisions. That could be because of prosecutorial 
restraint and careful statutory interpretation, or it could be due to crass 
calculations about sentencing. 
Examining the frequency of specific CFAA offenses, in Table 11, sheds 
more light on prosecutorial strategy.162 The most common CFAA criminal 
 
159 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2015) (recommending concurrent sentencing). 
160 Cf. United States v. Cioni, 649 F.3d 276, 281-83 (4th Cir. 2011) (invalidating  a CFAA felony 
enhancement for a Stored Communications Act violation, pursuant to the Double Jeopardy Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment). 
161 There are substantial policy consequences if this alternative theory is accurate. If Congress 
or the courts narrowed the taking information offense, prosecutors could respond by charging the 
fraud and intentional damage offenses with greater frequency. 
162 Two absences from criminal charging practice warrant brief mention. First, prosecutors 
made almost no use of CFAA’s password trafficking provision. See infra Table 11. Since a substantial 
proportion of the Internet’s underground economy involves stolen login credentials, the omission 
reaffirms that law enforcement has had difficulty reaching sophisticated offenders. 
CFAA’s unintentional damage and loss offense is also missing from criminal practice. See infra 
Table 11. Apparently, the Department of Justice did not file a single charge under that provision in 
2012. See infra Table 11. A likely explanation is that the statutory elements include intentional 
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charge parallels the most common civil claim: taking information.163 That 
result comes as little surprise, since the taking information offense is the 
broadest in the statute. 
 
Table 11: Frequency of Specific CFAA Provisions in Criminal Prosecutions 
 
 
In a departure from the practices of private plaintiffs, however, prosecutors less 
frequently allege CFAA’s broad fraud offense.164 Criminal defendants face a fraud 
charge at roughly a third the frequency that plaintiffs include a fraud claim.165 
This result suggests that prosecutors are making a greater effort than private 
litigants to distinguish among fraud theories of cybercrime liability. Prosecutors 
appear to generally treat CFAA fraud as a species of financial fraud—most cases 
directly involve either financial misconduct (11, 46%)166 or a financial institution or 
agency (12, 50%).167 
Another departure from civil practice is how prosecutors have invoked 
CFAA’s intentional damage offense. Criminal defendants face a charge under 
that provision roughly half more often than civil cases invoke it. What’s more, 
 
unauthorized access. If prosecutors can already clear that mental state hurdle, they can likely 
demonstrate that the subsequent damage or loss was reckless or intentional. 
163 See infra Table 11. 
164 See supra Table 11. 
165 Compare supra Table 11, with supra Table 6. 
166 See Criminal Dataset, supra note 86 (((1030(a)(4) ∨ 1030(a)(4) Conspiracy) ∧ Financial 
Misfeasance) / (1030(a)(4) ∨ 1030(a)(4) Conspiracy)). 
167 See id. ((Financial Institution Computer System) / (1030(a)(4) ∨ 1030(a)(4) Conspiracy)).	 
Charge 
(Principal, Attempt,  
Accomplice, or  
Conspiracy Liability) 
  Statutory  
  Provision  
Defendants 
Taking Information 1030(a)(2)(C) 63 (47%) 
Intentional Damage 1030(a)(5)(A) 49 (37%) 
Fraud 1030(a)(4) 24 (18%) 
Taking Federal Information 1030(a)(2)(B) 15 (11%) 
Reckless Damage 1030(a)(5)(B) 9 (7%) 
Extortion 1030(a)(7) 7 (5%) 
Trafficking in Passwords 1030(a)(6)(A) 5 (4%) 
Taking Financial Information 1030(a)(2)(A) 3 (2%) 
Accessing a Federal System 1030(a)(3) 1 (1%) 
Unintentional Damage and Loss         1030(a)(5)(C)    0 (0%) 
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most of the cases under that provision involve either a circumvention of a 
technical protection (35, 71%)168 or a software disruption (11, 22%).169 
At a high level, this result indicates that part of CFAA is functioning as 
intended. Cases under CFAA’s intentional damage provision map closely 
onto archetypal computer abuse of the sort that Congress and state 
legislatures emphasized when they enacted cybercrime statutes. 
Looking more closely at fact patterns, though, prosecutors are not treating 
the intentional damage offense as a distinct theory of cybercrime liability. 
Most criminal cases involving CFAA’s intentional damage offense appear 
much better characterized by the statute’s taking information offense. While 
prosecutors have made a meaningful effort at distinguishing CFAA’s fraud 
offense, they have treated the intentional damage offense as a catchall. 
A likely explanation for why prosecutors are lumping fact patterns into 
the intentional damage offense is that it has uniquely enhanced sentencing 
consequences. As a statutory matter, the intentional damage offense is 
automatically associated with a maximum sentence of ten years.170 And, under 
the federal sentencing guidelines, intentional damage automatically increases 
a defendant’s recommended period of incarceration.171 
In sum, prosecutors appear to exhibit complex strategic behavior in 
distinguishing cybercrime offenses. Where there is little or no sentencing 
difference, prosecutors are exercising much greater restraint than civil 
plaintiffs. They usually charge just one type of violation, and they usually 
select an appropriate theory. 
Where there is a sentencing difference, though, prosecutors are blurring 
the distinctions between cybercrime offenses. They tend to charge just one 
type of violation—but they often charge the violation associated with 
substantially enhanced punishment, not the violation that best fits the 
defendant’s conduct. 
b. External Redundancy 
Only a slight majority of CFAA prosecutions involve at least one           
non-CFAA charge (69, 52%).172 
 
 
 
168 See id. (((1030(a)(5)(A) ∨ 1030(A)(5)(A) Conspiracy) ∧ Circumvention of a Technical 
Protection) / (1030(a)(5) ∨ 1030(A)(5)(A) Conspiracy)).	 
169 See id. (((1030(a)(5)(A) ∨ 1030(A)(5)(A) Conspiracy) ∧ Software Disruption of a Computer 
System) / (1030(a)(5)(A) ∨ 1030(A)(5)(A) Conspiracy)).  
170 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(B)(i). 
171 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(18)(A)(ii) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2015) (directing an offense enhancement of four levels where the charge is intentional damage). 
172 See infra Figure 13 ((Count of defendants with › 1 non-CFAA charge) / (All Criminal Defendants). 
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Figure 13: Number of Non-CFAA Charges in Criminal Prosecutions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What’s more, among prosecutions that involve archetypal computer 
abuse—circumvention of a technical protection or disabling a computer 
system—most defendants face only CFAA charges (45, 58%).173 This result 
stands in stark contrast to civil litigation practice. In criminal law, cybercrime 
offenses are fairly unique.174 Examining the frequency of specific criminal 
charges, seen in Table 12, sheds more light on prosecutorial strategy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
173 See Criminal Dataset, supra note 86 (((Circumvention of a Technical Protection ∨ Software 
Disruption of a Computer System) ∧ Only CFAA Charges) / (Circumvention of a Technical 
Protection ∨ Software Disruption of a Computer System)).	 
174 An alternative interpretation, that prosecutors are strategically charging solely cybercrime 
offenses because they are the most punitive and easiest to prove, would also be consistent with this 
data. But examining the federal criminal statutes controverts that hypothesis—there are not lesser 
federal offenses that would generally reach archetypal computer abuse. 
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Table 12: Frequency of Non-CFAA Charges in Criminal Prosecutions 
 
Non-CFAA Charge 
(Principal, Attempt, Accomplice,  
or Conspiracy Liability)
Statutory 
Provision 
  Defendants 
Identity Theft 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1028, 1028A 
(2012)
30 (23%) 
Wire Fraud 18 U.S.C. § 1343 23 (17%) 
Bank Fraud 18 U.S.C. § 1344 22 (17%) 
Access Device (Production, 
Trafficking, Possession, or Use)
18 U.S.C. § 1029 16 (12%) 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO) 
Conspiracy 
18 U.S.C. § 1962 9 (7%) 
False Statements to a Federal 
Official
18 U.S.C. § 1001 7 (5%) 
Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
Disclosure 
42 U.S.C. 
§ 1320d-6 
4 (3%) 
 
The commonality between these cocharged offenses is that they are all (but 
one) accompanied by higher maximum or recommended sentences than the most 
frequent cybercrime offenses.175 Where prosecutors do file a noncybercrime 
charge, then, they appear motivated by sentencing considerations. 
The most common cocharge, identity theft, would seem to be an odd 
pairing for cybercrime offenses. The text of the statutory scheme primarily 
contemplates conventional identity theft involving forged documents.176 But 
about half of cybercrime cases involving an identity theft charge arise from 
accessing another person’s account on an online service (15, 50%).177 The 
underlying statutory interpretation appears to be that entering another user’s 
login and password constitutes an actionable form of identity theft. 
This result bolsters the theory raised earlier that prosecutors strategically 
blur statutory offenses where enhanced sentences are available. In a plain 
reading of text and legislative history, the federal identity theft statute was 
 
175 The offense for false statements to a federal official, 18 U.S.C. § 1001, carries the same 
maximum and recommended sentences as the most common cybercrime offenses. U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(11) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). Compare 
18 U.S.C. § 1028(b)(2), with 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(2)(B). 
176 See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028(a), 1028A(a), (c). 
177 See Criminal Dataset, supra note 86 (((Identity Theft ∨ Identity Theft Conspiracy) ∧ Accessing 
Another Person’s Account Without Permission) / (Identity Theft ∨ Identity Theft Conspiracy)).	 
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intended to cover a distinct set of fact patterns from its neighboring computer 
abuse statute.178 But identity theft offenses are accompanied by substantial 
and automatic sentence enhancements, so prosecutors have also styled 
computer abuse to fit within these identity theft offenses.179 
A notable omission from the top cybercrime cocharges is the federal trade 
secret statute, part of the Economic Espionage Act (EEA).180 Given that so many 
criminal prosecutions involve employees absconding with business information 
(51, 38%),181 one would expect many cases to include trade secret counts. But there 
was only one CFAA case in 2012 that included an EEA count (1, 1%).182 
A partial explanation is that nearly half of these employee prosecutions 
arise from government employment (23, 45%),183 where trade secret 
protection is not available. As for the remainder, it is possible that prosecutors 
view the (slight) sentencing increases associated with a trade secret charge as 
offset by the (significant) additional offense elements.184 
 
178 See 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (framing most offenses in terms of “identification documents” and 
“authentication features”); id. § 1028A (explicitly omitting CFAA as an overlapping offense for 
purposes of aggravated identity theft). The early legislative history of section 1028 centered on 
forged identification paperwork. See False Identification: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 19 (1982) (statement of Rep. William J. Hughes, Chairman, 
Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary) (highlighting fraudulent identification in 
association with check forgery, travel, and firearm purchasing). Later expansion of the statute, 
including the provisions that (arguably) reach computer credentials, focused on identity theft and 
associated financial fraud. See S. REP. NO. 105-274, at 4-9 (1998); Identity Theft and Assumption 
Deterrence Act: Hearing on S.J. Res. 512 Before the Subcomm. on Tech., Terrorism, and Gov’t Info. of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 1, 2 (1998) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl, Chairman, Subcomm. on 
Tech., Terrorism, and Gov’t Info. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (emphasizing identity theft 
arrests and financial losses). 
179 See 18 U.S.C. § 1028(b)(1)(D) (imposing maximum sentence of fifteen years for identity 
theft if a defendant obtains $1,000 in value within one year); id. § 1028A(b)(2) (imposing mandatory 
two-year, non-concurrent sentence enhancement for aggravated identity theft); U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(11) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015) (suggesting automatic 
enhancement to recommended sentence for identity theft offenses). 
180 18 U.S.C. § 1832. 
181 See Criminal Dataset, supra note 86 ((Employee, Consultant, Contractor, or Distributor ∧ 
Misappropriating Information) / (All Criminal Defendants)).  
182 See id. ((Trade Secret Theft) / (All Criminal Defendants)).  
183 See id. ((Employee, Consultant, Contractor, or Distributor ∧ Misappropriating 
Information ∧ Government Computer System) / (Employee, Consultant, Contractor, or 
Distributor ∧ Misappropriating Information)).	 
184 The trade secret provisions of the EEA include a ten-year maximum sentence, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1832(a), but are subject to the same sentencing guidelines as common CFAA offenses, U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(11) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). 
Moreover, the EEA trade secret offense incorporates a number of additional elements, including 
reasonable measures to maintain secrecy and independent economic value on account of secrecy. See 
18 U.S.C. §§ 1832, 1839; Cyber Security: Protecting America’s New Frontier: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 49 (2011) 
(statement of Professor Orin S. Kerr) (“Establishing a theft of trade secrets requires proving all the 
1498 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 164: 1452 
An examination of specific charge coincidence, as demonstrated by Table 
13, lends further support to the earlier observations about cybercrime’s 
uniqueness, as well as how prosecutors are charging identity theft and fraud 
offenses. 
 
Table 13: Coincidence Between the Most Common CFAA and Non-CFAA 
Charges in Criminal Prosecutions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The cybercrime offenses that relate to taking information from a federal 
government computer, and recklessly damaging a computer, have near-zero 
charge coincidence. In these areas of misconduct, CFAA provides especially 
unique criminal law coverage. 
The high coincidence between information misappropriation charges and 
identity theft charges reaffirms that prosecutors are strategically invoking identity 
theft offenses to secure sentencing enhancements. These are fundamentally 
computer abuse cases, involving account break-ins. 
Finally, CFAA fraud charges are frequently paired with wire fraud or bank 
fraud charges (12, 50%).185 This result further confirms that, in prosecutorial 
practice, cybercrime fraud is largely a species of conventional financial fraud. 
F. Does Cybercrime Law Deter Computer Abuse? 
In a conventional quantitative evaluation of deterrence, a cybercrime offender 
is motivated by the potential gain associated with misconduct, less the sentence 
imposed by criminal law, discounted by the probability of successful prosecution.186 
 
elements of the crime, and that can be a difficult task. In contrast, proving [under CFAA] that an 
employee did something for reasons other than official company business is vastly easier.”). 
185 See Criminal Dataset, supra note 86 (((1030(a)(4) ∨ 1030(a)(4) Conspiracy) ∧ (Wire Fraud 
∨ Wire Fraud Conspiracy ∨ Bank Fraud)) / (1030(a)(4) ∨ 1030(a)(4) Conspiracy)) . 
186 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 176-79 
(1968) (offering a theoretical approach to measuring deterrence based on the number of offenses a 
criminal would commit, the probability of conviction per offense, and “a portmanteau variable 
representing all . . . other influences”); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 
COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1201-05 (1985) (justifying criminal sanctions based on the need to impose optimal 
deterrence for such offenses, which pecuniary penalties alone cannot achieve). 
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Available datasets on cybercrime are not sufficiently comprehensive or detailed 
to credibly estimate these values for individual offenders. It is possible, though, to 
compute aggregate metrics of how cybercrime law deters cybercrime offenses. 
One simple measurement is a comparison of total cybercrime gains to total 
cybercrime sentences in a given year. The result is a very rough approximation of 
expected punishment relative to the incentive to commit cybercrime. 
   
   
 
 
A slightly more sophisticated measurement takes advantage of cybercrime 
time series data by treating year-to-year changes as natural experiments. By 
comparing the volume of punishment in sequential years, it is possible to—
again, very roughly—estimate the marginal punishment imposed by 
cybercrime law relative to the incentives for cybercrime. In intuitive terms, 
this measure reflects how responsive the criminal justice system is to changes 
in cybercrime volume.  
                                             
 Prosecution data from the Department of Justice are reasonably accurate 
and are sufficient to calculate the numerators in these equations. The 
denominators, by contrast, are much more difficult to obtain. Data sources on 
gains and losses associated with cybercrime are notoriously unreliable,187 and 
many high-profile breaches are associated with nonmonetary motives. 
In the interest of generating highly defensible figures, I conservatively 
estimate the gains from cybercrime as those solely due to domestic credit card 
fraud.188 I also liberally estimate the punishment associated with cybercrime 
by including not just CFAA offenses, but also federal identity theft and access 
device offenses. 
 
 
 
187 See Ross Anderson et al., Measuring the Cost of Cybercrime (critiquing prior attempts at 
quantifying cybercrime as inconsistent and inaccurate), in THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION 
SECURITY AND PRIVACY 265, 267 (Rainer Böhme ed., 2013); Dinei Florêncio & Cormac Herley, 
Sex, Lies and Cyber-Crime Surveys (noting survey errors in attempts to quantify cybercrime), in 
ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND SECURITY AND PRIVACY III 35, 37 (Bruce Schneier ed., 2013). 
188 The underlying data on credit card fraud are sourced from a regular financial newsletter 
that maintains a longitudinal fraud dataset. See Card Fraud Losses Reach $16.31 Billion, NILSON REP. 
(HSN Consultants, Inc., Carpinteria, CA), July 2015, at 5, 10 (reporting trends in credit card fraud 
from the 1990s onwards). For purposes of the marginal punishment metric, movement in credit card 
fraud functions as a rough proxy for movement in the overall level of cybercrime. 
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Figure 14: Deterrence Effects of Federal Cybercrime Law  
(Months Incarcerated Per $100,000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Even with these exceedingly generous assumptions—likely underestimating 
incentives and overestimating punishments by orders of magnitude—the results 
are unequivocal. If a would-be offender can expect to earn (very roughly and 
conservatively) $100,000 and serve just one month in prison, and if punishment 
levels are far outpaced by incentive growth, then cybercrime law cannot 
meaningfully deter cybercrime. 
G. Assessing the Two Perspectives on Cybercrime Law 
In civil cybercrime litigation, the critical perspective has strong empirical 
support. The volume of litigation has radically increased, and the 
overwhelming majority of claims do not arise from sophisticated hacking. 
Rather, cases relate to mundane commercial disputes that happen to involve 
computers. Considerable evidence indicates that civil cybercrime liability is 
duplicative of conventional private causes of action, and that private plaintiffs 
greatly blur theories of cybercrime liability. 
The data on criminal litigation are much more mixed. Cybercrime charges  
increased from the 1990s to the 2000s, but then leveled off. Prison sentences 
have shot up, but prosecutors continue to exercise substantial discretion over 
whether to impose any incarceration. Prosecutors generally only charge under 
one theory of cybercrime liability, but this is likely due to strategic sentencing 
calculations. A little over half of criminal charges arise from archetypal 
hacking activities, and prosecutors do succeed in occasionally prosecuting 
serious offenders. But most defendants engage in unsophisticated and minor 
misconduct, arising from an existing commercial, employment, or personal 
relationship. In sum, the state of cybercrime prosecutorial practice is highly 
nuanced, and neither perspective is descriptively accurate. 
2016] Cybercrime Litigation 1501 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Several prescriptions follow naturally from this comprehensive empirical 
portrait of cybercrime litigation. The data provide support for three readily 
implementable proposals: congressional elimination of civil CFAA liability, 
the establishment of clear Department of Justice enforcement priorities, and 
a narrow interpretation of cybercrime statutes.189 
A. Civil Liability 
Providing private causes of action for cybercrime has proved to be a failed 
experiment, spurring an explosion of highly redundant litigation. 
The underlying cause of this phenomenon appears to be readily 
discernable: Conventional employment and commercial disputes increasingly 
involve information technology, are relatively straightforward to investigate, 
and can generally be addressed through conventional legal processes. 
Sophisticated hacks, by contrast, can be difficult to uncover and attribute, and 
perpetrators will often be either outside the reach of United States courts or 
judgment proof.190 In more precise policy terminology, private cybercrime 
liability poses a fundamental target inefficiency.191 If cybercrime law even 
cracks the door to mundane private controversies, they will naturally swamp 
serious computer abuse cases. 
The easy statutory fix is to eliminate private cybercrime causes of 
action.192 Textual revisions are trivial to make, since cybercrime statutes were 
drafted primarily as a set of criminal offenses.193 Private causes of action 
 
189 This part focuses primarily on federal reforms in the interest of brevity and because the 
data examined in this Article were exclusively federal. Nevertheless, these same recommendations 
extend to state legislatures, prosecutors, and courts. 
190 Notably, in a review of recent high-profile data breaches, almost none resulted in civil litigation 
or criminal charges. See Chronology of Data Breaches, PRIVACY RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE (Apr. 20, 2005), 
http://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach [https://perma.cc/8EAG-U8N6] (providing a dataset of data 
breach incidents). 
191 See Robert S. Goldfarb, Compensating Victims of Policy Change, REG., Sept.–Oct. 1980, at 22, 
24 (explaining the theory of target inefficiency). 
192 Cf. Brenton, supra note 10, at 457-59 (recommending the partial repeal of CFAA’s private cause 
of action); Cindy Cohn & Marcia Hofmann, Part 2: EFF’s Additional Improvements to Aaron’s Law, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 23, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/01/part-2-effs-
additional-improvements-aarons-law [https://perma.cc/YP2Q-H5NC] (recommending the total repeal of 
CFAA’s private cause of action, among other revisions); Eric Goldman, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
is a Failed Experiment, FORBES (Mar. 28, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/03/28/the-
computer-fraud-and-abuse-act-is-a-failed-experiment/ [https://perma.cc/HZK4-ZMXS] (same); Orin 
Kerr, Proposed Amendments to 18 U.S.C. 1030, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 20, 2013), http://volokh.com/
2013/01/20/proposed-amendments-to-18-u-s-c-1030/ [https://perma.cc/8U7D-DQVT] (same). 
193 See Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 962, 965-66 (D. Ariz. 2008) (“Simply stated, 
the CFAA is a criminal statute focused on criminal conduct. The civil component is an afterthought.”). 
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generally consist of secondary add-on provisions, which Congress and state 
legislatures could simply repeal.194 
B. Enforcement Priorities 
Most federal cybercrime prosecutions arise from minor and technically 
unsophisticated misconduct, especially employees misappropriating information. 
There is, though, a meaningful subset of prosecutions that involves serious 
computer abuse. 
The Department of Justice should establish a clear cybercrime 
enforcement policy to shift this balance.195 Where a fact pattern involves 
special factors—for instance, technical sophistication, significant monetary 
loss, or a federal computer system—federal prosecutors should consider filing 
cybercrime charges. But where the circumstances are more mundane, such as 
a commercial or employment dispute that happens to involve information 
technology, the local United States Attorney’s Office should (at most) refer 
the matter to state and municipal law enforcement agencies.196 
An enforcement policy could also address concerns about cybercrime 
overbreadth. Prosecutors rarely charge ordinary consumers, journalists, or 
security researchers under cybercrime law—yet there is a widely perceived 
legal risk for those communities.197 Department of Justice officials already 
assert a lack of prosecutorial interest in those fact patterns; formalizing a 
declination policy would go a long way toward allaying concerns.198 
Finally, an enforcement policy could facilitate doctrinal clarity for 
cybercrime law, enhancing conformity with the statutory scheme and 
promoting predictability in criminal justice outcomes. Federal prosecutors do 
currently appear to be making good-faith attempts at distinguishing 
individual cybercrime offenses—but only where there is no sentencing 
 
194 At the federal level, for instance, eliminating civil liability would simply require repealing 
18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2012). 
195 Cf. Tim Wu, Fixing the Worst Law in Technology, NEW YORKER NEWS DESK (Mar. 18, 2013), 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/fixing-the-worst-law-in-technology [https://perma.cc/WTP3-
QMB6] (recommending that the Department of Justice adopt a narrow CFAA enforcement policy). 
196 Cf. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., Guidance Regarding Marijuana 
Enforcement 3-4 (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/305829 1327
56857467.pdf [https://perma.cc/GT7K-EU6D] (establishing Department of Justice enforcement 
policy for marijuana offenses, such that state and local law enforcement have primary responsibility). 
197 See supra Section I.B. 
198 See, e.g., David Bitkower, Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism, 
JUST. NEWS (July 8, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-assistant-attorney-general-david-
bitkower-delivers-testimony-senate-judiciary [https://perma.cc/7FKE-4WP6] (“The department has no 
interest in prosecuting such harmless acts.”); Leslie R. Caldwell, Prosecuting Privacy Abuses by Corporate and 
Government Insiders, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/blog/prosecuting-
privacy-abuses-corporate-and-government-insiders [https://perma.cc/WVY6-KVFH] (“The Department of 
Justice has no interest in prosecuting harmless violations of use restrictions like these.”). 
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advantage. The Department of Justice could easily provide guidance on which 
statutory offenses are most appropriate for recurring fact patterns.199 
C. Narrow Construction of CFAA 
The courts are presently engaged in a debate about the appropriate scope of 
federal cybercrime law. Since CFAA’s scoping provisions are so ambiguous, 
courts have resorted to reading proverbial legislative history tea leaves. Some 
conclude that Congress did not intend for CFAA to have broad reach, going far 
beyond archetypal hacking;200 others conclude that Congress did contemplate 
liability for mundane computer misuse, especially by employees.201 
The empirical data on federal cybercrime litigation enable a powerful new 
argument to be made from CFAA’s legislative history. Congress may have 
intended to open the federal courthouse door—just a crack—to claims 
involving routine and unsophisticated computer misconduct.202 But Congress 
 
199 Cf. U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES 1-58 (2010) (reviewing 
components of CFAA for United States Attorneys). 
200 See, e.g., United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 2012) (concluding that a 
narrower interpretation of CFAA “maintains the CFAA’s focus on hacking rather than turning it 
into a sweeping Internet-policing mandate”); Black & Decker (US), Inc. v. Smith, 568 F. Supp. 2d 
929, 935-38 (W.D. Tenn. 2008) (discussing the legislative history of CFAA at length to bolster its 
conclusion that CFAA should not be read broadly); Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 
962, 963-67 (D. Ariz. 2008) (“[T]he legislative history supports a narrow view of the CFAA.”); Int’l 
Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Werner-Masuda, 390 F. Supp. 2d 479, 495-99 (D. Md. 
2005) (relying on the legislative history of CFAA to interpret the statute). 
201 See, e.g., NCMIC Fin. Corp. v. Artino, 638 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1058 (S.D. Iowa 2009) 
(reviewing aspects of CFAA’s legislative history before adopting a broad view of the statute); 
Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1127-29 (W.D. 
Wash. 2000) (relying on Senate Reports to construe CFAA broadly). 
202 In my own reading of the legislative history, Congress did—ever so slightly—consider the 
issue of unsophisticated employee liability. See S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 7-8 (1996) (establishing 
liability for “individuals who intentionally . . . abuse their authority to use . . . a computer and 
thereby obtain information of minimal value”); Security in Cyberspace: Hearings Before the S. Subcomm. 
On Investigations of the S. Comm. on Gov’t Affairs, 104th Cong. 6 (1996) (statement of Sen. John Glenn) 
(“Over the years, this Committee has examined threats to security and privacy as diverse as . . . IRS 
employees browsing through taxpayer records . . . .”); id. at 326 (statement of Richard G. Power, 
Editor, Computer Security Institute) (“Also, in recent weeks, it was revealed that several employees 
of the Social Security Administration allegedly passed information on 11,000 people . . . to a credit 
card fraud ring.”); Computer Fraud Legislation: Hearing on S.440 and S. 1678 Before the S. Subcomm. on 
Criminal Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 35 (1985) (statement of Victoria Toensing, 
Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen.) (noting an incident where a former employee of the Federal Reserve 
illicitly accessed money supply information on a computer system); Computer Crime and Computer 
Security: Hearing on H.R. 1001 and H.R. 930 Before the H. Subcomm. on Crime of the the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 30 (1985) (statement of John C. Keeney, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen.) 
(discussing the potential for computer-based financial fraud by bank employees); id. at 149-150 
(statement of Allan Robert Adler, Legislative Counsel, ACLU) (noting possible CFAA application 
to government employees who use data for whistleblowing); id. at 213-14 (debating propriety of 
employee liability for mishandling information); 98 CONG. REC. 31,992-93 (1984) (statement of 
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did not intend to fling the door wide open, for so much run-of-the-mill 
commercial litigation.203 
Setting aside the merits of any individual case, the aggregate civil and 
criminal caseloads under CFAA simply cannot be reconciled with a fair 
reading of the legislative record.204 Nearly every cybercrime anecdote that 
Congress considered, and nearly every statement in the record, presumed 
legislation would reach archetypal hacking.205 There was almost no opposition 
to CFAA expansion based on potential liability for employees, competitors, 
or consumers.206 If the statute were intended to sweep as broadly as it does 
 
Sen. Patrick Leahy)(criticizing CFAA for putting government employees at risk when 
whistleblowing); id. at 32,083-84 (statement of Sen. Charles Mathias) (proposing amendment to 
CFAA that would restrict applicability to government employees). 
203 Cf. Shamrock Foods, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 967 (“The Court declines the invitation to open the doorway 
to federal court so expansively when this reach is not apparent from the plain language of the CFAA.”). 
204 In addition to this aggregate legislative history argument, and a more conventional 
legislative history argument, there are other reasons to narrowly construe CFAA. A broad 
interpretation raises myriad issues, including the rule of lenity, due process void-for-vagueness 
protections, nondelegation considerations, the expectation that Congress should speak clearly when 
determining significant policy, federalism, and judicial economy. See United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 
508, 523-28 (2d Cir. 2015) (following Nosal in applying the rule of lenity); WEC Carolina Energy 
Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 203-07 (4th Cir. 2012) (same); Nosal, 676 F.3d at 863 (invoking 
the rule of lenity in declining to extend CFAA to violations of a website’s terms of use); United 
States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 462-67 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that an interpretation of CFAA 
that reaches conscious violations of a website’s terms of use is constitutionally void for vagueness); 
Shamrock Foods, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 967 (D. Ariz. 2008) (“The Court declines the invitation to open 
the doorway to federal court so expansively when this reach is not apparent from the plain language 
of the CFAA.”); Samantha Jensen, Abusing the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Why Broad 
Interpretations of the CFAA Fail, 36 HAMLINE L. REV. 81, 137 (2014) (“A narrow interpretation of the 
CFAA is the only way to ensure that the statute does not eclipse large portions of state law.”); Alden 
Anderson, Comment, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Hacking into the Authorization Debate, 53 
JURIMETRICS 447, 457-59 (2013) (contending that a broad interpretation of CFAA is inconsistent 
with the historical division of cases between state and federal courts); Note, The Vagaries of Vagueness: 
Rethinking the CFAA as a Problem of Private Nondelegation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 751, 768-71 (2013) 
(arguing CFAA violates nondelegation doctrine). 
205 After an exhaustive review of committee hearings and reports on CFAA, I located only a 
handful of anecdotal references to employees misappropriating information. See supra note 206. 
Discussion of hacking, by contrast, pervades the legislative history. 
206 From a review of the legislative history, it appears that vocal opposition to CFAA is a recent 
phenomenon. Congressional hearings did not involve witnesses critical of CFAA’s scope until 2011, 
and those witnesses were only invited after public interest advocacy. See Cyber Crime: Updating the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to Protect Cyber Space and Combat Emerging Threats: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 27 (2011) (joint letter for the record from public interest 
organizations); id. at 48 (letter for the record from Gregory T. Nojeim) (advocating that the 
committee “address longstanding concerns with the ambiguity and breadth of the CFAA”); Cyber 
Security: Protecting America’s New Frontier: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism and 
Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 39 (2011) (statement of Orin S. Kerr, 
Professor of Law, George Washington University) (“I think the answer is to narrow the scope of 
[CFAA] . . . .”). The sole exception to this was some initial concern in the 1980s about enforcement 
against whistleblowers.  
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in its most common uses today—with significant implications for individual 
liability and the scope of federal jurisdiction—surely Congress would have 
spoken more plainly, and would have deliberated the consequences.207 
CONCLUSION: A LIMITED ROLE FOR CYBERCRIME LIABILITY 
Cybercrime is a serious and growing problem, resulting in (by some estimates) 
over $100 billion in losses per year.208 The primary response by federal and state 
legislatures, so far, has been to impose and expand cybercrime liability.209 
That approach is no longer tenable. The drawbacks of excessive scope are 
real—constituting a majority of civil cases and about half of criminal cases. 
Those drawbacks are inherent in the very concept of computer abuse liability. 
Constructing digital analogies to physical trespass and property damage 
had an understandable logic in the 1970s and 1980s; computer systems were 
relatively rare, single-purpose, limited to particular users, dedicated to 
sensitive applications, and had scarce resources.210 Legislators and courts 
could afford to play somewhat fast and loose with “authorization,” “damage,” 
and other key scoping provisions, since egregious misconduct was more 
readily ascertainable: breaking into the nuclear weapons laboratory at Los 
Alamos, for example, or tampering with medical records at the Sloan 
Kettering Cancer Center. Both of these examples are drawn directly from 
early hearings on federal cybercrime law.211 
 
207 See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 857 (“If Congress meant to expand the scope of criminal liability to 
everyone who uses a computer in violation of computer use restrictions—which may well include 
everyone who uses a computer—we would expect it to use language better suited to that purpose.”). 
208 See, e.g., CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L STUDIES, NET LOSSES: ESTIMATING THE 
GLOBAL COST OF CYBERCRIME (2014), http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-economic-
impact-cybercrime2.pdf [https://perma.cc/BBP8-ANZT] (extrapolating from global data on the cost of 
cybercrime to produce admittedly rough estimates of losses totaling between $375 and $575 billion). 
209 See Stewart Baker, Poisoning the Hamburger Helper, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 11, 2011), 
http://volokh.com/2011/09/11/poisoning-the-hamburger-helper/ [https://perma.cc/PE6J-8V6V] (“Every 
time Congress gets exercised about cybersecurity, the Justice Department claims that the CFAA needs to be 
updated.”); Orin S. Kerr, Powerpoint: Domestic Cybersecurity Law (or at Least Parts of It) (2014),  
http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/kerr_stanfordslides.pdf [https://perma.cc/853B-9XT7] (“Expanding 
CFAA becomes Congress’s favorite way to ‘do something’ about cybersecurity.”). 
210 Cf. Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in Computer Misuse 
Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1601 (2003) (“Unauthorized access statutes are creatures of the 1970s, 
when the Internet remained the domain of a few scientists and engineers . . . . While technology has 
advanced considerably in the last three decades, the law has not; the same one-size-fits-all prohibitions 
on unauthorized access still govern.”); Greg Pollaro, Disloyal Computer Use and the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act: Narrowing the Scope, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. ¶¶ 1, 10 (using one computer crime statute 
for myriad activities “has inevitably forced square pegs into round holes”). 
211 See Computer Viruses: Hearing on the Impact of Computer Viruses and Other Forms of Computer 
Sabotage or Exploitation on Computer Information Systems and Networks Before the S. Subcomm. On Tech. 
and the Law, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 6 (1989) (statement of Sen. Gordon J. Humphrey) 
(discussing a hack into the computers at Los Alamos); The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986: 
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Today, of course, computer systems are pervasive, have myriad functions, 
can be shared by millions of users, and are used for everyday activities. 
Assessing the scope of authorization and calibrating compensable harm are 
radically different and far more challenging tasks; defendants tend to have 
some permission with respect to a computer system, and conduct at issue tends 
to be less patently wrongful. Plaintiffs and prosecutors can craft a colorable 
cybercrime claim from myriad modern fact patterns, dragging the courts into 
doctrinal quagmires and chilling socially beneficial activities. 
As against this downside, there is not much upside. The plausible 
deterrence benefits of cybercrime law are, empirically, negligible. 
Cybercrime law does have value, to be sure. Prosecutors are able to charge 
serious offenders on occasion, and meaningful criminal sanctions should be 
available. But, on the whole, cybercrime law is an exceedingly limited 
mechanism for addressing online misconduct. 
The federal and state governments have a number of other viable 
responses to cybercrime. They could mitigate the harms associated with 
security breaches, by enacting notification and credit monitoring mandates.212 
They could improve defenses, by leveraging acquisitions, promoting best 
practices, and facilitating information sharing.213 In areas of critical 
infrastructure, or where sensitive data are involved, they could impose ex ante 
security standards and ex post regulatory liability.214 
 
Hearing on S. 2281 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 39 (1986) (statement of Joseph 
Tomkins, Chairman, American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section Task Force on Computer 
Crime) (describing the “infiltration of hospital records” at the Sloan Kettering Cancer Institute). 
212 At the time of writing, forty-seven states have enacted data breach notification laws. See Security 
Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 4, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/
telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/7
VAZ-RDQU] (collecting state data breach notification statutes). The Obama Administration has also twice 
proposed a federal data breach notification requirement. THE WHITE HOUSE, ADMINISTRATION 
DISCUSSION DRAFT: CONSUMER PRIVACY BILL OF RIGHTS ACT (Feb. 27, 2015), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/cpbr-act-of-2015-discussion-draft.pdf  [https://
perma.cc/5RSQ-F4Y7]; THE WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD       
(2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/SS9S-VRX8]. At 
the federal level, there are also sector-specific data breach notification rules. See GINA STEVENS, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL34120, FEDERAL INFORMATION SECURITY AND DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION 
LAWS (2010). 
213 See generally Jonathan Mayer & Edward W. Felten, California Must Lead on Cybersecurity, 
SACRAMENTO BEE (Jan. 24, 2015), http://www.sacbee.com/opinion/the-conversation/article7967445.html 
[https://perma.cc/WF89-DF5M] (suggesting state-level policies that would promote cybersecurity). 
214 See, e.g., FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 243-59 (3d Cir. 2015) (sustaining FTC 
Act liability for a breached business); COPPA Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312.8 (2015) (security requirements for certain 
children’s information); GLBA Safeguards Rule, 16 C.F.R. §§ 314.1-5 (2015) (security requirements for certain 
financial information);  HIPAA Security Rule, 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.302–.318 (2015) (security requirements for 
certain medical information); FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, CHAIRMAN WHEELER’S PROPOSAL TO GIVE 
BROADBAND CONSUMERS INCREASED CHOICE, TRANSPARENCY, AND SECURITY WITH RESPECT TO 
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For too long, federal and state policies have overemphasized malicious 
computer abusers as the exclusive cause of serious cybersecurity incidents. 
The temptation is understandable—as Ronald Coase famously observed, law 
conventionally allocates responsibility to actions that give rise to social costs, 
rather than inaction that magnifies those costs.215 But technology owners and 
operators are often in the best position to repel and remediate online 
misconduct. They just lack sufficient incentives to do so in the status quo—
incentives that cybercrime litigation will never provide. 
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